The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
305.
Sir Kevin
concluded:
“One is
still left with an air of unreality, given the enormity of what is
envisaged and
the absence
of planning detail or policy framework to credibly make it happen.
Part
of the
difficulty may be in the dysfunctional nature of the Washington
bureaucracy
under which
nothing is brought together except and until it reaches the
ultimate
level (and
Rumsfeld otherwise operates autonomously with his
Commanders-in-
Chief). But
on the basis of the visit we still have a job on our hands to
persuade the
Administration
to prepare for this in a way which would meet the Prime
Minister’s
conditions
for participation and, indeed for overall success.”123
306.
The letter was
sent to Mr Straw’s Private Office and to the Cabinet
Office,
Sir Richard
Dearlove, and Mr Brummell.
307.
The letter was
seen by Mr Blair124
and Lord
Goldsmith.125
308.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry that, at that stage, he and “a lot of other
officials”
were
concerned to ensure that the UK’s conditions “were … seriously
being pursued”,
rather than
(the UK) simply being invited to participate in detailed military
planning albeit
309.
Sir Kevin
stated that the first reason for the visit “was to be absolutely
clear
whether
they [the US] were determined to proceed on a military track. It
was not clear
at that
point.”127
The second
was to understand the thinking of the different groups
in
Washington.
310.
Sir Richard
Dearlove reported that the US had already taken a decision
on
action, the
question was how and when; and that he had been told it intended
to
set the
threshold on weapons inspections so high Iraq would not be able to
hold
up US
policy.
311.
Sir Richard
Dearlove discussed policy towards Iraq in a meeting with Dr Rice
in
Washington
on 19 July.128
312.
The report of
the discussion stated that the US view was:
•
There was
“growing evidence of the construction of CBW production and
links
to terrorists
[in Iraq] stoking fears of a repeat 9/11 with WMD”.
•
There was a
strong strategic case for removing Saddam Hussein.
Continued
development
of WMD was not in doubt.
•
A “casus
belli” already existed.
123
Letter
Tebbit to Manning, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
124
Manuscript
comment Manning on Letter Tebbit to Manning, 22 July 2002,
‘Iraq’.
125
Manuscript
comment Goldsmith on Letter Tebbit to Manning, 22 July 2002,
‘Iraq’.
126
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 28.
127
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 57.
128
Report, 22
July 2002, ‘Iraq [C’s account of discussions with Dr
Rice]’.
54