12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
148.
Underlying
problems with SSR started to be more clearly visible: the simple
metrics
used to
gauge success during the CPA era had obscured the actual number of
trained
police
officers; the integrity of many police officers was in doubt; and
the Iraqi ministries
responsible
for the ISF were dysfunctional. These issues had not been gripped
because
the
Coalition had focused too simply on the number of
officers.
149.
Sir Ronnie
Flanagan’s review in November 2005 appears to be the last
serious
attempt to
argue that there should be a single, coherent policy on SSR in
Iraq. Although
Sir Ronnie’s
final report in January 2006 stated that a broad strategic plan was
being
prepared in
conjunction with the Interim Iraqi Government, subsequent SSR
strategy
remained
largely incoherent.
150.
Sir Ronnie’s
final report came at a crucial time. The December 2005
Parliamentary
election
signalled a shift to greater Iraqi political independence. In
January 2006 the UK
Cabinet
approved the deployment of UK troops to Helmand province in
Afghanistan. The
UK’s SSR
objective in Iraq became almost exclusively to demonstrate that the
conditions
for
withdrawal were met. The requirement for a coherent SSR strategy
which would
establish
viable long‑term Iraqi Security Forces was set aside.
151.
After six
years in Iraq, it was difficult to judge what the UK had achieved
in the field
of SSR.
While the number of police appeared to have increased and the Iraqi
Army’s
confidence
had undoubtedly grown, without a clearly defined end state for
either there
was not an
appropriate benchmark by which the UK could measure whether it
had
achieved
what it set out to do.
152.
The UK knew
that the capability of the ISF was critical to withdrawal but did
not
design an
effective way by which it could measure that capability. Judgements
were
based
mainly on reports from theatre – the authors of which were also
without a formal
means of
measuring the ISF’s capability.
153.
Focusing on
the number of trained officers was a problem in Iraq because it
was
too
simplistic. It hid many of the complexities that sat behind and
skewed the numbers.
The UK was
unable to adjust that approach in Iraq because, up to 2006 (after
which
point its
ambitions for SSR changed), it never truly understood what
measurements
would
indicate whether the ISF was capable of maintaining security in
Iraq.
154.
After 2006,
“good enough” for Iraq informally became the benchmark. It was
never
clear
exactly what that meant. This loose benchmark was used as a
justification for
continuing
to plan for withdrawal in the face of contradictory
evidence.
155.
In 2009, the
fragility of the situation in Basra, which had been the focus of UK
effort
in MND(SE),
was clear. Threats to its security remained. The ISF continued to
be reliant
on support
from Multi‑National Forces to address weaknesses in leadership and
tactical
support. If
the capabilities of the ISF had been good enough, it seems unlikely
that the
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