The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
750.
Sir Nigel
explained that the UK was “not asking for the report to be
over-egged. We
should be
honest and say that there were no clear answers on what had
happened.” But
it was
important that Mr Duelfer should be able to conclude that, at
the very least, Iraq
was in
breach of UN resolutions.
751.
Sir Nigel
commented:
“The
problem is that the draft is getting worse, not better from our
point of view; and
it will be
difficult to secure a substantial change of direction at this
stage. But we will
try. John
Scarlett is in touch separately with the CIA.”
752.
Mr Scarlett
discussed the ISG draft report at a video conference on
23 March with
Mr McLaughlin,
Ms Miscik, Mr Duelfer, Maj Gen Dayton, Mr Howard and an
Australian
representative.416
Mr Duelfer
was working on three documents: the classified report;
an
unclassified
summary; and his personal statement to the Congressional
Committees.
The UK had
seen the first two and was expecting the third shortly.
Mr Duelfer
emphasised
that his personal statement would make clear that Iraq had been in
breach
of UN
resolutions.
753.
Mr Duelfer
also reported that three senior analysts had left the ISG, unhappy
with
what they
expected the report to cover. They had felt that Mr Duelfer’s
reluctance to
draw
conclusions reflected political interference rather than his stated
position that he
needed to
familiarise himself with his new responsibilities first. There were
concerns that
the three
might make their views public.
754.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald discussed the draft report with Dr Rice later on
23 March.417
He said
that the “key” was “a clear message that, whatever construction was
to be
placed on
what the ISG had found or not found, UNSCRs had been breached
and
suspicious
activity was continuing under Saddam”.
755.
Sir Nigel
commented that the discussion had been more encouraging than
might
have been
expected. It could still prove difficult to persuade
Mr Duelfer “to change tack
completely”,
but Sir Nigel’s contacts with Dr Rice and Mr Scarlett’s with
the CIA seemed
to have
“shaken up” the CIA to some extent. There should now be an
opportunity to
strengthen
the text to some degree.
756.
Mr Duelfer
visited London on 26 March to discuss the ISG Status
Report.418
He met Mr Howard’s
WMD Task Force and Mr Scarlett and Sir Nigel
Sheinwald.
416
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 23 March 2003, ‘ISG’.
417
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 23 March 2004, ‘Iraq: ISG’.
418
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 26 March 2004, ‘ISG’.
570