The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

President Bush was asked to submit two reports to Congress – by mid‑July and by

mid‑September – demonstrating progress against each of the benchmarks.

855.  Mr Blair visited Baghdad and Basra on 19 May.466 His Private Secretary reported

that he had meetings with Prime Minister Maliki, President Talabani and senior UK and

US military and civilian teams.

856.  Mr Blair discussed reconciliation with Prime Minister Maliki, and the criticism of the

Iraqi Government by foreign officials for its work against Ba’athists. Mr Blair observed:

“… that leadership presented many challenges, not least having to deal with criticism

from all sides even when one was pursuing the right policy.”

857.  In the briefing with US and UK senior teams in Baghdad, Mr Blair set out the case

for “a political initiative which would provide a framework for and a context to security

work under way in Baghdad and Anbar”. He agreed with Ambassador Crocker and

Mr Asquith that a statement of intent would not be enough; there must be a plan.

858.  In Mr Blair’s Basra briefing, Maj Gen Shaw noted that most of the violence was

directed at the MNF; only time would tell whether the intra‑Shia factional violence would

increase as UK forces drew down. Following PIC, the ability of UK forces to intervene,

including in strike operations against JAM and others, would gradually diminish,

but it would still be both necessary and possible to retain a residual training and

mentoring role.

859.  Commenting on the Prime Minister’s visit in his weekly report, Maj Gen Shaw

wrote:

“… the visit of the Prime Minister this week went well from the Division’s point of

view but less well, I suspect, from the overall Campaign IO [information operations]

perspective. The IDF attack during my brief to him was the story, described by the

Sunday People as an AQ‑inspired assassination attempt, an idiocy repeated by

Sky TV … IO is now the campaign main effort; it is not what we do between now and

departure, it is how our actions and departure are perceived. If we are to stand any

chance of leaving here with any national pride in our achievements, then we need

to address the domestic media judgement that this is a lost cause during, and out

of, which no good has come, and their practice of looking (and inevitably finding)

evidence to back up their prior editorial judgement.”467

860.  On his return from Iraq, Mr Blair spoke to President Bush to “report back” on his

visit.468 Mr Blair said that in the present situation politics had to create security rather

466  Letter Banner to Hickey, 20 May 2007, ‘Visit to Iraq, 19 May’.

467  Minute Shaw to CJO, 24 May 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq update – 24 May 2007’.

468  Minute Sheinwald to Banner, 21 May 2007, ‘Iraq’.

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