The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
that a
coercive strategy “must offer
carrots as well as sticks” to
“achieve
a
change” in the
behaviour of the Iraqi regime “without
conflict”. It also
required
a
“continued
credible threat of force”.
•
Diplomatic/Force: UN
inspections failed “at some point” and the
international
community
resorted to the use of force “with UN authorisation”.
•
Force:
Early failure of the UN route and either no UN resolution or
an
inadequate
one and a US‑led Coalition resorting to the use of force without
a
UN mandate.
1018.
The section on
post‑conflict issues had been substantially revised. It stated
that
the
“lasting impression of Coalition legitimacy and success” would be
“determined by the
nature of
the Iraqi nation” that emerged after the conflict. That had the
potential to “prove
the most
protracted and costly” phase of the campaign.
1019.
In its summary
of the implications of the post‑conflict phase for military
planning,
the paper
stated:
“•
The impact
of any enduring commitment on other operations would
be
significant.
A recommendation on the size of force the UK is prepared to
commit
must be
prepared, at least for the key six months following any operation
…
•
Planning
for Resolution Phase operations must be complete before the start
of
offensive
operations. Any UK land force HQ must have the capacity to
conduct
offensive
and Resolution Phase operations concurrently.
•
… clarity
on post‑Resolution Phase and likely UK contribution will be
needed
before
operations commence.”
1020.
The
post‑conflict issues raised by the SPG are addressed in Section
6.4.
1021.
A new section
addressed the problems the Coalition would face if
Saddam
Hussein
adopted a “Fortress Baghdad” strategy. The SPG stated that the
Coalition could
not “engage
in drawn out urban conflict”:
“Loss of
tempo, rising casualties and humanitarian efforts would undermine
Coalition
will to
continue and rapidly alienate regional supporters.”
•
maintaining
the moral and legal high ground by minimising civilian
casualties,
collateral
damage and own casualties;
•
trying to
avoid fighting in built up areas and to “guard and bypass” towns
and
cities,
including denying access to Baghdad, during offensive
operations;
•
attempting
decapitation of the regime;
•
isolation
of security forces still loyal to the regime and subversion
through
“aggressive”
information and psychological operations;
•
dominating
the rest of the country and implementing the “resolution
phase”;
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