The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
and those
with specialist skills. It proposed that “more use” was made of
police staff. The
Task Force
also advised ensuring that the spread of officers was more evenly
distributed
across the
forces (meaning a reduction in PSNI officers), and that the
transition should
be made
easier for returning officers by guaranteeing interviews for posts
for which they
are
qualified.
1049.
On 4 May 2006,
Mr Howard submitted a draft response for Dr John Reid,
who
became the
Home Secretary on 5 May 2006, to send to
Mr Straw.964
Mr Howard
said the
draft
emphasised that “recent operational experience ha[d] demonstrated
the need for
a robust
expeditionary policing capability, ideally acting as part of an
international force”
but also
made clear that the matter was “constrained by issues that can only
be resolved
by the
police itself.”
1050.
Mr Patey
wrote to Mr Pattison on 16 May, highlighting concerns that
“our effort on
SSR and the
Rule of Law in Iraq will suffer if we do not get staffing of our
policing effort
right”.965
Mr Patey
noted that there was a risk the UK would “continue to lose
credibility
in the eyes
of the US as a key partner” if that issue could not be addressed,
citing
the
frequent turnover of staff (recommending tours of more than one
year) and gaps
between
posting of senior staff as contributing to problems. He
acknowledged that those
were
manifestations of a wider problem in recruiting, and that there was
“little benefit to
the police
service for their good police officers to deploy to Iraq” requiring
“more radical
solutions …
In the short and longer term”. The letter concluded by recommending
that
the FCO
“should engage with the new Home Secretary, about the need for
appropriate
career and
reward packages to be in place for deployed officers and the need
for all
police
services to contribute to the effort”.
1051.
Mr Pattison’s
reply agreed with the premise that “good quality police staffing
is
central to
delivery of the UK’s objectives in Iraq” but noted that that needed
to be seen
in the
wider context, in particular that all UK police secondees were
volunteers.966
1052.
On 1 April,
Mr Blair wrote to President Bush outlining his views on the
steps
required to
achieve success in Iraq.967
He
suggested a strategy that involved pressing
hard for a
unity government and stated:
“This must
include a top quality, neutral figure in the Ministry of Interior.
It is
perfectly
obvious to me that a lot of the Shia violence is now being
organised out
of
there and there has to be a definite statement going
throughout the police, it
won’t be
tolerated.”
964
Minute DG
Op Pol to PS/SofS, 4 May 2006, ‘International Policing in
Peace Support Operations’.
965
Letter
Patey to Pattison, 16 May 2006, ‘Policing in Iraq’.
966
Letter
Pattison to Patey, 24 May 2006, ‘Policing in Iraq’.
967
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 1 April 2006 attaching Note
[Blair], 1 April 2006.
294