9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
to the
possibility of a more rapid UK military withdrawal than they would
wish
for, while
recognising the need to maintain our long term close
relationship
with the
US”;
•
if the UK
was likely to have a military presence in Iraq in 2009, officials
should
insert
themselves into US negotiations with the Iraqis to secure adequate
legal
cover
post-resolution; and
•
notwithstanding
the plans for a military drawdown, the UK should maintain
areas
of
political and economic engagement “where we could continue to add
value in
order to
maintain our reputation and relations with the Government of Iraq,
as
915.
The FCO
short-term strategy paper looked at the options for drawing down
UK
troops in
Iraq; the civilian and military tasks that the UK could continue to
undertake; and
assessed
the impact of a diminishing UK contribution on the UK’s
reputation.453
The FCO
identified options for military withdrawal as:
•
Withdraw by
May 2009: “do the benefits of leaving early (less risk to
life,
cutting our
losses in an environment where it is proving difficult to
achieve
objectives)
balance the risk of serious damage to our global reputation
(including
accusations
that after five years in Iraq the UK mission had failed) and to
our
relationship
with the new US President?”
•
Withdraw in
late 2009, but no announcement of a decision until the
new
US Administration
was in office: “should we maintain the costs of
staying
(financially/in
asset resource terms, risk to life, political risk (including
over
legal
basis), risks posed by increasing insecurity in Basra) into 2009 in
order to
protect the
UK’s reputation and relationship with the new US
Administration?”
•
Withdraw in
late 2009, but release Basra Air Station for economic
development
by the
Iraqis earlier and move a “smaller transitional force” to the Iraqi
Army
base at
Shaibah: “does reconfiguring our forces in this way enable us
to
withdraw
forces from Iraq by the end of 09 in a more effective way? Can
civilian
effect,
including delivery on the Prime Minister’s Economic Initiatives,
be
delivered
during 09 if UK forces reconfigure in this way? Would the extra
costs
of
developing Shaibah [Logistics Base] be justified?”
•
Stay on
indefinitely, with around 3,000 troops at Basra Air Station, in
order
to provide
continued support for the ISF, a secure platform for political
and
economic
work and “to protect the UK’s relationship with the new US
President”:
“do the
costs of remaining (financially/in asset resource terms, risk to
life,
political
risk) without a timeframe for withdrawal balance the benefits we
would
gain from a
continued presence (possible political, security, economic
progress;
reputational
(staying the course); better relations with the new
President)?”
452
Paper
Cabinet Office, 31 March 2008, ‘Iraq’.
453
Paper FCO,
March 2008, ‘Iraq: The Short Term’.
351