7 |
Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning
37.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry that, until 11 September 2001, the UK had a
policy
of containment,
but sanctions were eroding.12
The policy
was “partially successful”,
but it did
not mean that Saddam Hussein was “not still developing his
[prohibited]
programmes”.
38.
The attacks on
the US on 11 September 2001 changed perceptions about
the
severity
and likelihood of the threat from international terrorism. They
showed that
attacks
intended to cause large-scale civilian casualties could be mounted
anywhere
in the
world.
39.
In response to
that perception of a greater threat, governments felt a
responsibility
to act to
anticipate and reduce risks before they turned into a threat. That
was described
to the
Inquiry by a number of witnesses as a change to the “calculus of
risk” after 9/11.
40.
In the wake of
the attacks, Mr Blair declared that the UK would stand
“shoulder
to shoulder”
with the US to defeat and eradicate international
terrorism.13
41.
The JIC
assessed on 18 September that the attacks on the US had “set a
new
benchmark
for terrorist atrocity”, and that terrorists seeking comparable
impact might
try to use
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
devices.14
Only
Islamic extremists
such as
those who shared Usama Bin Laden’s agenda had the motivation to
pursue
attacks
with the deliberate aim of causing maximum casualties.
42.
Throughout the
autumn of 2001, Mr Blair took an active and leading role
in
building a
coalition to act against that threat, including military action
against Al Qaida
and the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. He also emphasised the potential
risk of
terrorists acquiring
and using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and the
dangers
of
inaction.
43.
In November
2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq had played no role in the 9/11
attacks
on the US
and that practical co-operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was
“unlikely”.15
There was
no “credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD-related technology
and
expertise
to terrorist groups”. It was possible that Iraq might use WMD in
terrorist
attacks,
but only if the regime was under serious and imminent threat of
collapse.
44.
The UK
continued actively to pursue a strengthened policy of containing
Iraq,
through a
revised and more targeted sanctions regime and seeking Iraq’s
agreement
to the
return of inspectors as required by resolution 1284
(1999).
12
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 8.
13
The
National Archives, 11 September 2001, September
11 attacks: Prime Minister’s statement.
14
JIC
Assessment, 18 September 2001, ‘UK Vulnerability to Major
Terrorist Attack’.
15
JIC
Assessment, 28 November 2001, ‘Iraq after September 11 – The
Terrorist Threat’.
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