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6.5  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003
Iraq. The question about what sort of resolution was needed for the administration and
reconstruction of Iraq should be parked. Mr Blair said that:
“The time to debate this would come when we had secured victory, and were in a
position of strength.”534
1278.  Mr Blair raised Phase IV issues with President Bush the next day. They
discussed the need to push for a quick agreement on the resolution to continue the
OFF programme, and for a separate resolution that would free up financial and troop
contributions from other nations, secure World Bank and IMF involvement and put
reconstruction on the right footing.535
1279.  Mr Rycroft recorded that Mr Blair had identified the main issue as whether
the UN formed the future Iraqi government or whether the Coalition did so with UN
endorsement, but had said that “it was not helpful to expose this distinction yet”.
1280.  After returning to the UK, Mr Blair told the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq that in relation
to the post-conflict administration of Iraq, “quiet and effective diplomacy” was the tactic
to achieve a new resolution.536
1281.  The process leading to the adoption of resolution 1483 in May 2003 is addressed
in Section 9.1.
1282.  Ms Short told DFID officials on 26 March that Mr Blair had given her
responsibility for reconstruction in Iraq.
1283.  Ms Short held a meeting with key DFID officials on 26 March at which she stated:
“The important thing was for the world to know that a resolution for a UN mandate was
coming.”537
1284.  At the meeting, officials reported a sense in Whitehall that a resolution
on reconstruction might not be achieved. Ms Short made clear that “significant
engagement” on reconstruction would need a UN resolution. The Attorney General
had been clear at Mr Blair’s meeting that morning that, under the Geneva and Hague
Conventions, no changes could be made to the administration by the Occupying
Powers, except to keep systems working for civilians. Ms Short asked her office to
request that the Attorney General’s advice be committed to paper.
1285.  Ms Short reported that “the Prime Minister had given her responsibility for
reconstruction in Iraq”. She stated that her role should be underpinned by a Cabinet
Office Committee chaired by Mr Chakrabarti, adding: “This area was our lead in
534 Letter Manning to McDonald, 28 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with President Bush at
Camp David: Dinner on 26 March’.
535 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 27 March 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with President Bush at
Camp David: Iraq Phase IV’.
536 Minutes, 28 March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
537 Minute Warren to Fernie, 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Secretary of State’.
537
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