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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
Navy will continue to rely on coalition naval power to achieve its mission for the
foreseeable future.”951
At that time, there were around 35 UK naval personnel working in Naval Assistance
Training Teams.952
1031.  Mr Des Browne became Defence Secretary in May 2006. He visited Iraq from
18 to 22 June.953 His Assistant Private Secretary recorded that Mr Jawad Boulani, the
new Minister of the Interior, told Mr Browne he was very clear about the need to reform
the police, particularly in Basra.
1032.  Major General Muhammed Latif, the Commander of the 10th Division, had told
Mr Browne that there were 15,000 police in Basra, but you could never find them on the
streets. If necessary, he was prepared to put a soldier in every police car to force them
to do their jobs. They failed to carry out even the most perfunctory investigations into
murders. Maj Gen Latif had started to use his own intelligence officers to follow up cases
and monitor police progress. When his staff asked questions about inaction, the police
would say that murders were “big boys’ issues”, usually a reference to the specialist
police organisations that Mr Boulani sought to disband.
1033.  During a meeting with UK representatives, Mr Browne was told by the police
advisor that “we [the UK] had originally set our sights too high; teaching forensics
instead of the basics”. Adjustments had now been made and the programme seemed to
be working well. The police advisor rejected the outright criticism from Maj Gen Latif and
said that there were “areas that had the start of an effective policing service”.
1034.  Air Chief Marshal Jock Stirrup, CDS, briefed DOP(I) in July:
“… the main issue affecting the population was sectarian murders. To see progress
on that we needed to take action against corrupt police officers and militia groups.”954
1035.  ACM Stirrup described progress with the Iraqi Army as “on track” but stated that
“the situation of the police was more difficult”.
Further reduction in troops
1036.  During early 2006, substantial effort was dedicated to preparation for the transfer
of lead responsibility for security in Muthanna and Maysan provinces. That effort is
detailed in Section 9.4.
951  Report, 6 September 2007, ‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq’.
952  Report, 5 July 2007, ‘PJHQ Manning Tables’.
953  Minute APS/SoS [MOD] to DCDS(C), 28 June 2006, ‘Secretary of State’s Visit to Iraq –
18‑22 June 2006’.
954  Minutes, 6 July 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
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