The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

107. Mr Brenton felt that “some new structures are needed” and recommended that the

UK should:

“… beef up John Sawers’ (and his successor’s) office so that we have a mechanism

in Baghdad which can make effective input on behalf of the UK into CPA decision-

making. We cannot continue to rely on the Sawers/Bremer link alone. Secondly …

we need the Americans to establish a formal decision-making body within the

CPA, on which a UK representative is included – given our responsibilities, we

really should have a formal say, rather than having to depend on friendly influence

and persuasion.”

108. On 12 June, a Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) briefing reported that there

was “a trend of intelligence reporting from the UK AOR [Area of Responsibility] showing

increasing dissatisfaction of the civil populace”.38

109. The PJHQ attributed the deterioration in the relationship between UK forces and

the local population to a lack of food, failure to ensure essential services “such as water,

electricity and security”, a general increase in anti-Coalition rhetoric from Shia clerics,

a lack of accurate information/news reporting and a lack of progress in the political

process. The briefing said that:

“The Iraqis are … used to having stability and security, albeit provided by a

dictatorial regime … If these services and a feeling of security fail to transpire …

then attitudes towards the Coalition may well harden … An increase in political

engagement by the Iraqi population, provided it remains short of violence and

insurrection, should be taken as evidence of progress towards normality.”

110. On 16 June, a Cabinet Office official wrote to the IPU to propose that work

on the Iraq strategy paper commissioned by the AHMGIR on 12 June should not

continue because:

“It now transpires that the CPA is in the process of drafting its own strategy/vision

document.”39

111. The CPA document was due to be finalised by late June/early July. The Cabinet

Office official recommended:

“Rather than developing a rival UK version, it would seem sensible to use the

existing work we have done as a basis to feed into the US version.”

112. Within the CPA’s formal structure, the most senior UK official was

Mr Andy Bearpark, CPA Director of Operations and Infrastructure, who arrived in

Baghdad on 16 June.40

38 Minute DACOS J3(Ops Sp) and DACOS J2(Int) to MA/DCJO(Ops), 12 June 2003, ‘Relations with the

Basrah Population’.

39 Minute Dodd to Crompton, 16 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Ad Hoc Ministerial’.

40 Briefing Cabinet Office, 18 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for Ministers’.

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