The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
70.
US planning
machinery was reorganised a number of times during 2002 and
2003:
•
Before
August 2002, two separate planning processes operated in parallel
in the
State
Department and the Department of Defense (DoD).
•
Between
August 2002 and January 2003, greater inter-agency
co-ordination
was loosely
overseen by an Executive Steering Group of the National
Security
Council
(NSC). The US Agency for International Development (USAID)
was
brought
into the planning process for the first time.
•
From
January 2003, all post-conflict planning was consolidated under Mr
Donald
Rumsfeld,
US Secretary of Defense.58
71.
The UK
introduced significant changes to its planning machinery in
September 2002
and
February 2003, in part to reflect US reorganisation:
•
Until
September 2002, a tightly held process was largely confined to
No.10
and the
MOD, with some work in the FCO and limited Whitehall
co-ordination
through the
MOD-based Pigott Group (described later in this Section) and
the
Cabinet
Office OD Sec.
•
Between
September 2002 and February 2003, the AHGI co-ordinated
Whitehall
planning at
official level. DFID, the Treasury and other departments
were
brought
into the planning process for the first time. The MOD attended the
AHGI,
but
planning for military operations continued on a separate
track.
•
From
February 2003, the inter-departmental Iraq Planning Unit (IPU),
located
in the FCO,
but including staff from the MOD and DFID, was
responsible
for
Whitehall planning for civilian aspects of post-conflict Iraq, with
the MOD
continuing
to lead on military planning.
72.
Those changes
are described in more detail later in this Section and in Section
6.5.
73.
The future
President Bush expressed his opposition to US military involvement
in
post-conflict
nation-building during the 2000 US presidential
election.
74.
In October
2000, Governor George W Bush cited the US military intervention
in
Somalia in
1992 and 1993 as an example of why the US military should not be
involved
in
nation-building.59
He said
that what had started as a humanitarian mission:
“… changed
into a nation-building mission, and that’s where the mission
went
wrong. The
mission was changed. And as a result, our nation paid a price. And
so
58
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
59
Commission
on Presidential Debates, 11 October 2000, October 11,
2000 Debate Transcript:
The Second
Gore-Bush Presidential Debate.
126