The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
terrorist
campaign. There were sundry Jihadists and Salafists and other
extremists
who were
attracted to Iraq as a vehicle for having a pot shot at the
Americans and
174.
Mr Straw
visited Iraq and met Ambassador Bremer at CPA Headquarters
in
175.
Ambassador
Bremer reported that he hoped to have a Governing Council of
20-30
“fairly
representative Iraqis” within two weeks. The mechanism by which
they would be
appointed
had not yet been finalised. The Council would be able to appoint
ministers,
examine the
budget and establish Commissions on elements of
reform.
176.
Mr Straw
urged Ambassador Bremer to articulate a calendar for the
political
process
because:
“This would
help dissipate some dissatisfaction, even if the milestones were
some
months
away. It would change the dynamic of the debate and help get Iraqi
buy-in
for the
process.”
177.
In a private
meeting with Mr Straw later the same day, Mr Vieira de
Mello
welcomed
Ambassador Bremer’s commitment to:
“… get the
Governing Council off the ground soon. This would alleviate
some
discontent
… Giving some Iraqi leaders visible responsibility for
developments
should also
reduce criticism of the CPA’s efforts.”71
178.
The day before
a video conference with President Bush planned for 3
July,
Sir David
Manning sent a note to Mr Blair offering advice on the
conversation.72
Sir David
wrote:
“This is a
key exchange.”
179.
Of the
messages that were vital to get across, Sir David identified
security as the
top
priority and suggested (noting that the MOD would probably
disagree) a surge of
large
numbers of troops into Iraq to get through the “security crisis”.
This should be
accompanied
by an accelerated reconstruction programme and a “very vigorous
political
programme”
plus an effective media strategy.
180.
Sir David also
highlighted that US analysis of Iranian involvement in Iraq
differed
from the
JIC’s assessment and questioned the value of taking
action.
69
Public
hearing, 10 December 2009, pages 79-80.
70
Telegram 24
FCO London to IraqRep, 3 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Meeting with the
Administrator
of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, 2
July’.
71
Telegram 25
FCO London to IraqRep, 4 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Meeting with UN Secretary
General’s
Special Representative for Iraq, 2 July’.
72
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 2 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Your video
conference with President Bush’.
234