The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
791.
The second
paper was entitled “Ensuring the Iraqis are Ready for a
Handover
of Security
Responsibility”. It highlighted two high level areas where there
was cause
for concern:
•
the output
of the Ministries – their ability to command, control and sustain
their
security
forces, with control of the Chiefs of Police being a “major issue”;
and
•
the proper
government control of the Ministries.
792.
The paper
stated that the coalition had “got what we resourced”: an
increasing
number of
officers on the ground but no overarching leadership and control
from the
Ministries
to which they were responsible. Action in the first 100 days of
government
was seen as
“essential”. MNSTC‑I was developing a plan on that basis, with a
surge
in resources:
“… MOI
advisers up from 76 to 113; MOD advisers up from 45 … to 103. It
is
envisaged
that military, civilian and contractors will be used to fill
civilian slots.”
793.
The paper made
a number of recommendations, including that
consideration
should be
given to increasing the number of UK security sector advisers (to
“include
some
‘doers’ in IMOD”) and measures to strengthen government control
including
bolstering
the MCNS.
794.
The minutes of
the meeting indicated that those recommendations were
not
795.
On 23
December, Mr Blair sent a Note to President
Bush.737
On
Iraqiisation, he wrote:
“I was
surprised people were more upbeat than I expected (and most
important the
ordinary
soldiers working alongside Iraqis). The two clear messages were:
the vital
nature of
leadership of the MOI and MOD; and 2006 being the year of the
police.
There may
also be equipment issues with the military and the
police.”
796.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Gen Sir Nicholas Houghton
said:
“It is
quite difficult to compartmentalise the aspiration and the optimism
of late
2005 …
the realities of the true state of the police were more dawning
realities, as
we moved
into 2006, where some of the … problems about death squads,
torture
dens, the
degree of militia infiltration of police, both nationally and
locally in Basra,
became more
evident, and I think that probably it was the policing issue that
lay on
the
critical path to most of the conditionality for effective
transition.
“… 2006 was
to be the year of the police, so it is not as if we were not aware
of the
fact that
this was the critical problem.
736
Minutes, 20
December 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
737
Letter
Quarrey to O’Sullivan, 23 December 2005, ‘Iraq’ attaching
‘Note Prime
Minister to
President
Bush’.
234