9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
523.
Mr McDonald
and C both noted the:
“… credible
reports of widespread intimidation of the Basrawi population,
the
presence of
several militias and the evident deficiencies of the Iraqi police.
Together,
these
suggested that there would continue to be violence following
re‑posturing, but
that this
would be intra‑Shia, and focused on gaining political
dominance.”
524.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Blair concluded that it would be:
“…
premature to make an announcement on redeployment before we had a
clear
plan that
answered the key points raised in discussion, and which had secured
US
and Iraqi
agreement. We should nonetheless continue to plan on the basis that
we
would
redeploy, in order to ensure that a prudent redeployment was not
delayed.”
525.
On 1 February,
Sir David Manning reported that Secretary Rice had asked
him
“to tell
her honestly whether the UK was now making for the exit as fast as
possible”.277
Sir David
had replied that that was not the case, “explained the arguments
for the
change in
force posture in Basra; and stressed that this should not be
confused with
transition
to PIC”.
526.
Sir David had
continued:
“… as the
Prime Minister and Secretary of State has said repeatedly, we
wanted
to move to
PIC in Basra but only when conditions were right. We believed
that
time was
coming: but we would not hand over prematurely; and we would not
do
so without
full consultation with US Commanders on the ground.”
527.
Cabinet Office
officials co‑ordinated a paper on ‘Transition in Southern Iraq’ for
the
meeting of
DOP on 1 February.278
The paper
invited Ministers to consider and endorse
a series of
assessments and proposals in preparation for a statement by
Mr Blair on
7 February,
including:
“i.
continuing our fundamental strategy of building Iraqi capacity and
progressively
transferring
responsibility for security to the Iraqi authorities;
…
“iv. the
rationale for the co‑location of military and civilian staff at the
Basra Air
Station,
the impact this will have on operations, and the need for further
work on
a proposal
for the future of the Basra Palace Compound;
…
277
Letter
Manning to Hayes, 1 February 2007, ‘Conversation with the US
Secretary of State,
31 January
2007’.
278
Paper
Cabinet Office, 31 January 2007, ‘Transition in Southern Iraq:
Progress and Plans’.
99