6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
424.
The paper’s
analysis of the impact on Iraq drew on three recent
precedents:
the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Afghanistan and East Timor. The
paper
concluded
that there were four reasons why reconstruction in Iraq might be
“even more
expensive”
than in the FRY, which had already cost nearly US$10
billion:
•
Iraq’s
infrastructure might be in a worse condition.
•
Iraq’s
economy would need stabilising after years of sanctions,
reckless
spending
and high inflation, and there was a huge external debt
burden.
•
A large
peacekeeping force would be needed to “keep a lid on” ethnic
and
religious
tensions.
•
The UK
should expect “heavy moral pressure” to make a generous
contribution
to the
reconstruction effort.
425.
The paper
added that, although reconstruction in Iraq might be more
expensive
than in the
FRY, it might be less challenging: Iraq already had “institutions
of
government”,
the private sector had not been completely destroyed, and Iraq
was
much richer.
426.
That analysis
informed a paper on Treasury policy towards post-conflict
Iraq
produced in
February 2003 (see Section 6.5).
427.
In the 4
September edition of its paper on UK military strategic
thinking,
the SPG
stated:
“Given
fractious nature of Iraqi politics, broad regional concern on
nature of
new Iraqi
government, and poor state of Iraqi infrastructure, delivery of
stated
post-conflict
objectives will require lengthy engagement.”
428.
The SPG
also stated that:
•
“lack of
clarity in US on post-conflict Iraq means we do not yet have
a
winning
concept”;
•
the “key
military question” to be addressed was whether there was
a
winning
military concept; and
•
the absence
of a clear post-conflict strategy would be a reason for
not
participating
in the US plan.
429.
It is not
clear who outside the MOD saw the SPG paper.
430.
On 4
September, the SPG issued the third edition of its paper on
military strategic
thinking,
previously updated on 11 July.237
237
Paper
[SPG], 4 September 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
183