The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
Sections 6.4
and 6.5 consider the UK’s planning and preparation for a
post-Saddam
Hussein
Iraq between late 2001 and March 2003.
2.
Section 6.4
covers the period up to Mr Blair’s decision on 17 January 2003 to
deploy
UK forces
to support US military preparations.
3.
Section 6.5
covers the 10 weeks between the decision to deploy UK forces and
the
first
post-invasion meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush at Camp
David on
26 and
27 March 2003.
4.
The two parts
address:
•
the
development of UK post-conflict strategy and
objectives;
•
planning
and preparation to implement those objectives;
•
UK civilian
and military planning machinery;
•
UK
influence on US planning and preparation and the impact of US
planning on
the UK;
and
•
Parliamentary
interest in post-conflict planning and preparation.
5.
The two parts
do not consider:
•
military
plans for the invasion, which are addressed in Sections 6.1 and
6.2;
•
intelligence
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or preparations for
the
post‑invasion
search for WMD, addressed in Section 4;
•
the
financial and human resources available for post-conflict
administration and
reconstruction,
addressed in Sections 13 and 15; and
•
the outcome
in post-conflict Iraq, which is addressed in Sections 9 and
10.
6.
Descriptions
of US preparations for post-conflict Iraq in Sections 6.4 and 6.5
are
mostly
taken from Hard
Lessons, Mr Stuart
Bowen’s account, as US Inspector General
for Iraq
Reconstruction, of the US experience of reconstruction between 2002
and 2008.
7.
Key findings
for Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are listed below.
8.
The Inquiry’s
conclusions relating to Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are at the end of
Section 6.5.
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