9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
516.
At DOP(I) on
12 January, Mr Straw said that “the key issue was how
we
encouraged
the creation of a credible, sustainable government of national
unity
517.
During his
recent visit, Shia contacts had told him that they were finding
it
“increasingly
difficult to restrain their community in the face of Sunni
insurgent activity”
and felt
the UK and the coalition were showing too much partiality to the
Sunnis.
518.
In discussion,
(unidentified) attendees made the points that:
“The longer
the political vacuum continued, the greater the risk of losing
momentum
and of
seeing a further deterioration in security. However, it was
essential to get the
new Iraqi
government right and this might result in delay.
“We should
continue to emphasise to the Shia that the Sunnis must participate
in the
next
government as of right, on the basis of the results of the
elections.”
519.
On 15 January,
Lt Gen Houghton reported that Gen Casey had returned
from
Washington
with “political cover” for two key issues: that transition would be
the central
focus of
the Campaign Plan during 2006 and that there would be no political
demand for
troop
reductions beyond what Gen Casey was content with.245
520.
Lt Gen
Houghton wrote that:
“The
emphasis on transition has had the effect of bringing some of the
practicalities
and
difficulties into sharp focus. From the perspective of MND(SE)
there are a
number of
local challenges: the Japanese, PRTs, logistic practicalities and
US
concerns
regarding the Iranian border. I judge that all of these can be
finessed …
The major
threat to UK aspirations for transition is one of timing and
derives from
the desire
for the Iraqi government to be the authority for making the
decisions on
provincial
transfer. It is in this context that the early seating of the next
government is
important …
for every week beyond the end of February that the government fails
to
form, a
further week must be added to the anticipated timing of transfer
…
“What we
must avoid doing at all costs, I judge, is to do our own thing
(unilaterally)
regardless
of the niceties of the internal Iraqi process. I say this for two
primary
reasons:
a. First
the UK is acknowledged to be the USA’s primary strategic partner
in
Iraq, with
a proportionate political and military investment. To break
company
with the US
on the process of transition would be to risk undermining
that
strategic
partnership …
244
Minutes, 12
January 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
245
Minute
Houghton to CDS, 15 January 2006, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (195) 15
January 06’.
575