The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“This is
not a reason for not taking Saddam out. It is a reason to prepare
for a
potentially
long, costly nation-building operation and to enlist as many allies
as
possible to
share the burden.
…
“My most
knowledgeable Iraqi friend tells me he is confident that the
morning after
any US
invasion, US troops would be welcomed by Iraqis and the regime
would fold
quickly. It
is the morning after the morning after that we have to be prepared
for.
“In the
best case, a ‘nice’ strongman will emerge from the Iraq army to
preside over
a gradual
transition to democracy, with America receding into a supporting
role. In
the worst
case, Iraq falls apart, with all its historical internal tensions –
particularly
between its
long-ruling Sunni minority and its long-frustrated Shia majority.
In that
case,
George W Bush will have to become Iraq’s strongman – the iron fist
that holds
the country
together, gradually re-distributes the oil wealth and supervises a
much
longer
transition to democracy.
“My Iraqi
friend tells me that anyone who tells you he knows which scenario
will
unfold
doesn’t know Iraq.”
439.
Sir
Christopher Meyer reported on 5 September that the US Government
was
considering
starting to make the case against Saddam Hussein, including by
using
President
Bush’s speech at the UN General Assembly to indict him and
circulating a
draft
resolution the following week.239
Congressional
resolutions authorising military
action
would be sought in early October.
440.
On 6
September, Sir Christopher Meyer advised that, while President
Bush’s
decision to
take the UN route and to consult widely at home and abroad was
welcome,
it left
“a raft of questions unanswered”.240
441.
Sir
Christopher judged that a military invasion and its aftermath would
be “less
perilous
[for the US] in company”. On post-conflict issues, he
wrote:
“The
preconditions for military action are a focal point for Camp David.
So are
post-war
Iraq and the MEPP [Middle East Peace Process] … The President
seems
to have
bought the neo-con notion that with the overthrow of Saddam all
will be
sweetness
and light in Iraq, with automatic benefits in the rest of the
Middle East
(which
partly explains his inactivity on the latter). In reality, it will
probably make
pacifying
Afghanistan look like child’s play. The US is probably in greater
need
of
coalition and UN support for what is likely to be a very protracted
post-war
phase, than
for the attack itself. Afghanistan has shown that the US is not
good at
consolidating
politically what it has achieved militarily.”
239
Telegram
1130 Washington to FCO London, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq: The US
Diplomatic Game Plan’.
240
Telegram
1140 Washington to FCO London, 6 September 2002, ‘PM’s visit to
Camp David: Iraq’.
186