The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1049.
At the same
time, some important differences remained. In particular, the
US
wanted:
•
the
resolution authorising Phase IV to identify the US-led civil
transitional
authority
as the main body leading reform and reconstruction;
•
the UN
Special Co-ordinator to be subordinate to the Coalition
military
commander;
•
the US to
oversee the process leading to the creation of the
IIA;
•
the IIA to
be managed closely by the Coalition rather than lightly supervised
by
the UN
Special Co-ordinator; and
•
the
Coalition to continue to exercise control over IIA decisions in
areas for which
the IIA had
been given responsibility.
“… the US
want the UN Security Council to authorise them to take charge of
the
reform and
reconstruction of Iraq. Although they accept the need to
internationalise
activity in
Phase IV, they want to keep the whip hand.
“The US
approach is almost certainly not negotiable in the UN Security
Council. And
the last
thing we need is another prolonged and acrimonious wrangle in the
Council
over the
details of the day after arrangements …
“We made
clear to the US last week, (and many times before that) our view on
the
shortcomings
of their Phase IV concept. President Bush’s public statement at
the
Azores
Summit and the US/UK/Spanish vision for Iraq provide good
foundations on
which to
build. We must keep the US to these commitments. The alternative
would
be grim –
no Security Council authorisation would mean no wide international
effort,
and the
likelihood of a much less consensual environment in which to
operate: in
short, far
from a recipe for mission success.
“The next
procedural step is for the US to send us their version of the draft
UNSCR
for Phase
IV … Meanwhile, we should continue to offer our advice, as their
best
friends, on
what is and is not likely to work.
“The key to
reconciling US and UK differences may lie in the personality of the
figure
identified
as the UN Special Co-ordinator.”
1051.
The FCO did
not address the implications for the UK of a failure to
reconcile
those
differences.
1052.
Ms Short
advised Mr Blair of continuing shortcomings in
humanitarian
preparations.
500