10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

696. In early September, Ambassador Bremer published a “Seven Step Plan” for the

restoration of Iraqi sovereignty (see Section 9.2).386 The Plan did not include a timescale,

although to most observers it appeared to mean at least a two-year Occupation.

697. On 5 September, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice a Note from Mr Blair for

President Bush ahead of their video conference later that day.387

698. In the Note, Mr Blair proposed doubling the number of Iraqi police and speeding

up the process of letting reconstruction contracts. In the South, he had “authorised” the

CPA to “just spend the money and recoup later from CPA(Centre)”. Mr Blair expressed

support for Ambassador Bremer, and queried whether he had all the administrative and

technical support he needed.

699. On the media, Mr Blair wrote:

“Media: My obsession. I understand that Gary Thatcher is making a big difference.

But there are five terrestrial channels to fill … apparently, there is a fear that bringing

in outside i.e. US/UK networks would be a problem for the Governing Council.

That’s a pity, if true. Because the obvious solution is for us … to task one of the

big companies to sort it out. We need this fast. It is essential to keep building Iraqi

consent and understanding.”388

700. Mr Blair concluded:

“So my basic point is: the problem is not complex to identify: it is security. The best

solution is not us or at least us alone but the Iraqis. It is speed in building their

capacity – security, intelligence, infrastructure, media – that we need.”

701. Mr Cannon reported to Mr Straw’s Private Office on 5 September that, during the

video conference, Mr Blair had recommended to President Bush that “a new impetus

should be given to infrastructure reconstruction, both short-term and longer-term

projects”, and had expressed concern that there were problems in transferring funds for

infrastructure projects from CPA(Baghdad) to CPA(South).389 Mr Blair had also asked

whether Ambassador Bremer needed more administrative/technical support, including

to reinforce the civil effort in the Provinces.

702. Mr Cannon also reported that Dr Rice and Sir Nigel would draw up a list of

concrete measures that could be taken to improve the situation.

703. Sir Nigel and Dr Rice discussed those measures later that day, and on

11 September Sir Nigel sent Dr Rice a “UK/US Action Plan” which sought to “define

386 Dobbins J, Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional

Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009.

387 Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 5 September 2003, [untitled], attaching Note [Blair to Bush], [untitled].

388 Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 5 September 2003, [untitled], attaching Note [Blair to Bush], [untitled].

389 Letter Cannon to Adams, 5 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Video-Conference with Bush,

5 September’.

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