The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
409.
A series of
“transition plans” would be required “to get us from where we are
now
to where we
want to be”. Those would include:
“(1)
Capacity‑building. Capacity‑building plans for the elements of the
Security
Sector are
well advanced but they need greater refinement to reflect the need
for
capability
rather than just quantity …
…
“(3)
Militias. There are assessed to be 52 militias ranging in size from
12 to 31,000.
They have
represented useful short‑term expedients, and some may need to
feature
as part of
the longer term accepted Security Architecture. A policy for
militias is
starting to
emerge.
…
“(6)
Information Operations/Strategic Communications … extant plans
have: focused
too much on
30 Jun as a watershed; … have dealt too much in promises and
have
not focused
enough on achievements and tangible successes.”
410.
Maj Gen Houghton
judged that: “The time has already passed when a
strategy
could have
been imposed on the Iraqis and there is a danger that we may now be
trying
to develop
one too late.”
411.
On the most
effective method of training, Maj Gen Houghton advised
that:
“Evidence
from within theatre indicates that the best way to grow genuine
capability
within the
ISF is to embed coalition troops and International Police Advisors
(IPA)
inside
Iraqi units.”
412.
Maj Gen Houghton
provided some suggested points to stress in public
statements,
including:
“(1)
Significant progress already made in capability/capacity‑building
within ISF.
“(2) ISF
already achieving local control in some areas …
“(3) Need
to maintain a sensible balance of risk in progressing Iraqiisation
with the
operation
realities of the security situation. The relevant timescale is
spring 06 for us
to assume
strategic stand‑off.”
413.
In an annex,
Maj Gen Houghton described the status of SSR in Iraq as
of 25 May:
•
Over 80,000
police officers were operational with approximately 20,000
having
received
training. An accelerated training programme was now being put
in
place by
CPATT.
•
The DBE had
been “successfully … reconstituted” (see Box, ‘The Iraqi
border
police’,
later in this Section).
146