6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
1077.
The letter
proposed that the “final UK Divisional Area of Responsibility,
including
for
aftermath operations, would be an area bounded by the Iraq/Kuwait
border in the
south,
Jalibah airfield in the west, the Euphrates in the north, and the
Shatt al Arab
waterway in
the east – a largely Shia area of some 1,600 sq km518
[see Map 5
in
Annex
4]”.
1078.
The letter
suggested that the proposed UK role in the South “should
enable
US forces
to reach further, faster, whilst providing a coherent transition to
aftermath
operations
– an area of acknowledged UK expertise – in territory captured
early in
the
campaign”. Because the proposed UK role would be “crucial to the US
plan in the
South”, it
“would place us in a very awkward position if the US seemed likely
to want to
proceed in
circumstances with which we were not content”. Further MOD advice
would
follow
“next week”.
1079.
Mr Blair told
the Cabinet on 9 January that “the build up of military forces
was
necessary
to sustain the pressure on Iraq”.519
1080.
Commenting on
the preparations for the deployment of military forces to the
Gulf,
Mr Hoon
told his colleagues that no decisions had been taken to launch
military action.
Nor had the
US finalised its military planning.
1081.
Mr Blair said
that Cabinet the following week would “provide the opportunity for
an
in-depth
discussion of Iraq”.
1082.
Discussion in
Cabinet on 9 January is addressed in more detail in Section
3.6.
1083.
Lord Turnbull,
Cabinet Secretary from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that,
when
Cabinet met
on 9 January, Ministers were told:
“...
nothing was inevitable. We are pressing the UN option. No decisions
on military
action,
whereas you can see that, at another level, the decisions on
military action
were
hardening up quite substantially.”520
1084.
Lord Turnbull
added:
“I could
see he [Mr Blair] did not want key discussions of … who was going
to bring
what forces
to bear where, and there is some sense in that. But the strategic
choices
that they
implied … didn’t get discussed either. For example, the fact that
if you have
ground
forces you become an occupying power.”
518
The figure
of 1,600 sq km was used repeatedly in policy and briefing papers
during January and
February
2003. This was mistaken. It should have been approximately 16,000
sq km.
519
Cabinet
Conclusions, 9 January 2003.
520
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 15-16.
295