The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
It would be
“helpful … to have a better feel for the ‘post‑conflict’ thinking
and
aftermath
management”. The experience of Afghanistan had shown it
was
“as important
to win the peace” as it was to win the war. That was “fresh”
in
the UK’s
mind, and it was “undoubtedly true that both UK politicians and
…
military
colleagues would like to know what we are getting ourselves into in
the
longer
term”.
•
Maj Gen Wilson
concluded that the “involvement of significant UK land
forces”
would be a
“challenge”. The UK agreed “that the most obvious option”
was
“through
Turkey”; but more information was needed on what effect was
desired
and
“further guidance” was needed “on the political
context”.
506.
Maj General
Wilson stated that he could not stress too much that he “would
have
been shot”
if he had extended his brief. There had been “no questions” and he
had
been “the
last to speak”.211
Asked about
the reaction to his talk, Maj Gen Wilson told
the
Inquiry:
“Probably ‘yoo‑hahs’ and a few of those delightfully American
idiosyncrasies.”
507.
Lt Gen Reith
reported that Gen Franks saw great value in a northern axis
led
by the UK,
but UK preparations needed to begin.
508.
Between 5 and
7 August, Lt Gen Reith visited the US Army Central
Command
(ARCENT) HQ
and CENTCOM.212
509.
Lt Gen Reith
reported to ACM Bagnall:
“The
indicators point to CENTCOM being ready to commence operations from
about
mid‑Nov 02,
with the main attack to launch from early Jan 03. Gen Franks
is keen
for strong
UK participation. He sees great value in an axis from TU [Turkey]
led
by UK.”
510.
There was,
however, concern about Turkey’s position. If an attack was not
possible
from the
north then the Kurdish oilfields would still need to be secured
from the south.
Lt Gen Reith
reported that Gen Franks had suggested that could also be a
“worthwhile
discrete
task for the UK”. There was a general readiness to provide US
support if that
would make
it possible for UK forces to arrive earlier.
511.
Lt Gen Reith
concluded:
“With the
US clock ticking, from an operational perspective, we ought to
start our
own. We
need political and financial approval as soon as is feasible to
prepare, but
without
committal to deploy. Without this the PM’s choices will be limited
and he may
not be able
to fulfil what are clearly high US expectations.”
512.
Lt Gen Pigott
issued military planning guidance on 8 August.
211
Public
hearing, 4 December 2009, pages 13‑14.
212
Minute
Reith to MA/VCDS, 8 August 2002, ‘Visit to ARCENT/CENTCOM 5‑7 Aug
02’.
252