The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
calling for
prompt action by the Government of Iraq to achieve key
milestones
(including
progress on the Constitutional review, de‑Ba’athification,
oil
revenue‑sharing,
provincial elections and Kirkuk) particularly on
reconciliation,
security
and governance, and proposing a reduction in US assistance
if
substantial
progress was not made;
•
launching a
New Diplomatic Offensive, including the creation of an
“Iraq
International
Support Group”, including Iraq, all the States bordering
Iraq
(including
Iran and Syria), the key regional States, the five permanent
members
of the UN
Security Council, and the EU); and
•
beginning
an urgent review of the Constitution in the interests of
national
reconciliation,
with the assistance of the UN.178
323.
Sir David
Manning wrote to the FCO in London on the day of the
report’s
publication
with an account of a briefing by Mr Baker. Sir David assessed
that:
“At first
blush, it contains much which we should welcome, both on the
internal
situation
in Iraq, and on the centrality of other regional issues, including
MEPP and
engaging
Syria and Iran … the ISG report means that there are now powerful
voices
in
Washington advocating change.”
324.
Mrs Beckett
publicly welcomed the report as:
“… a
substantial and complex piece of work, to which of course the Prime
Minister
and senior
[British] officials have contributed. From those discussions, [we]
get the
impression
that their thinking was broadly in line with our own but obviously
we need
to read and
digest their formal recommendations.”179
325.
Sir John
Sawers told the Inquiry that the recommendations had reflected a
concern
that there
was a limit to what could be achieved in Iraq and that it would be
better to
focus on
“working more closely with the likes of Iran and Syria and about
finding a basis
to withdraw
US forces sooner rather than later”.180
326.
In preparation
for the 7 December meeting of DOP(I), officials prepared a paper
on
military
plans for Southern Iraq in 2007, and another paper on the UK’s
objectives and
presence in
Basra.
327.
The military
plan for southern Iraq proposed the withdrawal of most UK
troops
from bases
in Basra city to Basra Air Station at the end of Op SINBAD which
effectively
marked the
“graduation exercise for the Iraqi Army in Southern
Iraq”.181
From there,
UK
forces
would perform a “Military Assistance Mission”. That would lead to a
reduction in
178
eGram
54298/06 Washington to Various, 6 December 2006, ‘Publication of
the Report on the Iraq
Study
Group, 6 December’.
179
BBC
News, 6
December 2006, In quotes:
Reaction to Iraq Panel report.
180
Public
hearing, 16 December 2009, page 97.
181
Paper MOD
officials, 5 December 2006, ‘UK Military Plans for Southern Iraq in
2007, a briefing paper
for DOP‑I
by Officials’.
62