9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
involved
were known to MND(SE), there were problems in targeting them
directly as it
would
require UK forces to re-commence strike operations in Basra,
“action that would
prejudice
the accommodation process with the mainstream of JAM”.
766.
Maj Gen Binns
discussed the attacks with Governor Waili and said that while
UK
forces
could deal with the attacks, the people they would harm most were
the people
of Basra
because of the direct impact on economic development and
investment.
Governor
Waili undertook to develop a plan to deal with the problem as a
priority.
767.
Government
officials working closely with the military in Basra also reported
rising
levels of
IDF, including an attack on 31 January that was the heaviest ever
experienced
by Basra
Air Station.371
JAM1
claimed that the attacks were the work of a splinter
group
and not of
his supporters, a claim which the officials considered to be
justified.
768.
On 1 February,
bombs exploded at two popular Baghdad markets in what
appeared to
have been co-ordinated attacks.372
Mr Prentice
reported that the local media
believed
there to be at least 70 dead and more than 120 injured, though MNF
estimates
were lower.
Mr Prentice commented that these were the deadliest attacks in
Baghdad
since the
surge began the previous summer. He wrote:
“Initial
reporting was that these attacks had been carried out by female
suicide
bombers,
with Al Qaida (AQ-I) being the prime suspect. However,
eyewitness
reports
state that the two women wearing the bombs were mentally ill …
[and]
regularly
frequented the markets.”
That led to
speculation that the bombs had been detonated by remote
control.
769.
Mr Prentice
reported that there had been an increase in the use of female
suicide
bombers;
they were actively recruited by AQ-I as they were unlikely to be
searched by
men at
checkpoints. He commented:
“It may
never be known for sure who was behind these attacks. But, if it is
confirmed
that two
mentally ill women were used as ‘mules’, a new low in bestial
criminal
activity in
Iraq will have been set.”
770.
In early
February, Lt Gen Rollo reported that the solution to replacing the
Australian
troops
appeared to be focused on “the nearest wolf to the sled”, with
backfill to be
achieved by
“double tasking a battalion already at Tallil”.373
371
Email
government official working closely with the military, 4 February
2008, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:
Act 2’
attaching ‘Discussion Paper: Maintaining the Accommodation,
Reducing IDF’.
372
eGram
3913/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 2 February 2008, ‘Iraq: Double
Bombing in Baghdad
Street Markets’.
373
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 3 February 2003, ‘Weekly Report 3 Feb
08’.
323