The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
878.
CC Kernaghan’s
visit report on 25 May stated:
“… progress
has been made in training Iraqi Police Service personnel.
However,
with the
exception of groups such as the Tactical Support Unit they remain
of
questionable
quality. The initial concept of creating a community policing
force
on the
classic Anglo‑American model appears to have been overtaken by a
more
realistic
recognition, that first and foremost a police force must be
effective if it is
to secure
public support. Thus in the face of an insurgency, it is essential
that the
force can
defend itself and its police stations. This has improved but
philosophical
confusion
still appears to bedevil the project … I am still of the view that
there is a
disconnect
between CPATT [Baghdad] and the British led effort within
MND(SE).”837
On 4 July
2005, the record of the Iraq Senior Officials Group
stated:
“The work
of our international policing adviser in Baghdad was being hampered
by
the scale
of the US presence and the difficulty of securing buy‑in from the
Minister
of the
Interior. An emerging conclusion was that we should concentrate our
effort on
MND(SE),
moving our adviser there and away from the national policing
strategy.
This would
be consonant with our broader policy, but could risk sending the
signal
that we
were concerned only with the South‑East.”838
879.
On 19 May,
Dr Reid briefed Cabinet that he had “been encouraged” by
the
progress in
building up the ISF and that he hoped it would be possible for the
ISF to
take over
from UK forces in MND(SE) in “the course of the next
year”.839
He stated
that
progress
with the Iraqi police was “less advanced” and that the border
forces were the
“least
capable”.
880.
On 5 June,
Maj Gen Riley produced a post‑tour
report.840
On SSR he
wrote:
“A good
plan is now in place for the expansion of the Iraqi Army … The
barrack
building
plan is properly resourced and is delivering. The training and
recruiting
plans are
in place … Equipment is going well … I remain concerned about
the
ability of
the IA chain of command to issue orders and ensure compliance
with
those orders.
“You know
my views on police reform. I have now formed teams to take on
those
areas in
which we have taken the lead from the FCO/Civil Police:
organisation,
management,
control systems, administration, leadership, paramilitary
training,
837
Report
Kernaghan to Clarke and Fox, 25 May 2005, ‘Report on
4th
Visit to
Iraq by Chief Constable
Kernaghan –
12/16 May 2005’.
838
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Asquith, 4 July 2005, ‘Iraq:
Senior Officials Group’.
839
Cabinet
Conclusions, 19 May 2005.
840
Report
Riley to CJO, 5 June 2005, ‘Commanding General’s Overview
Multinational Division (South
East) and
British Forces Iraq’.
256