The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1332.
Lord Drayson
told the Inquiry:
“I actively
stressed the importance of addressing the deficiencies of
equipment
on
operations following my visits to theatre and feedback from front
line reports.
However the
opportunities to redirect resources from core Equipment
Programme
were
limited by the inherent resistance in the system to changes to the
core
Equipment
Programme outside the annual planning rounds. It was very difficult
to
reach
agreement on the re‑prioritisation of resources as there was no
flexibility in
the budget.
It required a push from me to do this. I also asked for the
Department
to look
at rationalising the equipment programme to create a 10‑15%
head‑room for
reprioritisation
to meet short‑term operational requirements.”708
1333.
Asked how
effective the MOD’s efforts were to draw on core
Equipment
Programme
funding to support ongoing operations, Lord Drayson
wrote:
“… the
Services were concerned that their long term programmes would
be
cannibalised
and lose funding to short term operational needs … it was
quite
unusual for
core equipment funding to be redirected to operational
needs.
This only happened
when the military had a strong desire for it …”
708
Statement,
15 December 2010, page 7.
226