The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
181.
Mr Williams
wrote that the deterioration in Iraq’s security had led “to an
increase
in demand
for force protection measures, including armoured (Land Rover type)
patrol
vehicles
and specialist counter‑terrorist equipment”. He said that, although
the MOD
had looked
at utilising Northern Ireland’s resources to meet the requirement,
there was
a need to
ensure that the equipment was “appropriate to the threat in Iraq”.
He added:
“Some
development effort is likely to be required.”
182.
Mr Williams
outlined the requirement in an attached annex:
“The most
serious threat facing UK personnel in Iraq (military and civilian)
is
that from
Radio‑Controlled (RC) IEDs. It took PIRA [the Provisional IRA]
some
years to
develop RCIEDs and associated tactics successfully. By contrast, as
a
result of
state‑sponsored activity, FRL (Former Regime Loyalists) forces,
already
well
equipped and experienced, were able to mount attacks of similar
technical
sophistication
in Baghdad, Basra and elsewhere in Iraq without a pause after
the
fall of
the Ba’athist Regime … A further trend is evident in theatre:
terrorist attacks
(and
tactics and equipment) may be trialled in the US area, but it does
not take them
long to
appear in the UK area.”
183.
The annex
referred to evidence that between 11 July and 31 October 2003
there
were 28
IEDs detected in MND(SE); of those, nine employed remote
detonation.
It stated
that one UK serviceman had been killed90
and there
were “various degrees of
injury to
UK personnel”.
184.
In the
US‑controlled areas, IED attacks were occurring at a rate of around
10 per
day, with
80 percent of those being radio-controlled.
185.
Mr Williams
explained that, whilst some existing ECM equipment was
effective
against
threats in Iraq, the most significant threats were new and
therefore required
a new
response. He stated that only about 25 percent of UK vehicles would
need to be
fitted with
equipment on the basis that vehicles moved in groups for mutual
protection.
He
cautioned that, “owing to the high level of its security
classification, and the restricted
industrial
base, there are limits to the manufacture rate” and stated that the
first new
equipment
would arrive in Iraq in December 2003.
186.
On 6 January
2004, a briefing note sent to Mr Hoon and Gen Walker
stated that
the
Treasury had “recently agreed” to fund the £73m for Project
L*.91
187.
The question
of how that funding could be met was part of wider,
ongoing
discussions
with the Treasury which are referred to later in this Section and
set out
in Section
13.1.
90
Captain
David Jones was killed in a remote-controlled IED attack on 14
August 2003: BBC
News,
15 August
2003, Welsh
soldier killed in Iraq.
91
Briefing
McKane to APS/Secretary of State [MOD] and PSO/CDS, 6 January 2004,
‘Operation TELIC:
Presentation
to the Chief Secretary’; Letter Williams to Dodds, 18 November
2003, ‘Additional Operation
TELIC
UORs’.
34