Previous page | Contents | Next page
3.6  |  Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003
Iraqi responses to military action might include “seizing hostages as ‘human
shields’; using non‑lethal BW in a deniable manner; suicide attacks; or a
scorched earth policy with the aim of creating humanitarian or environmental
catastrophe. At some point, motivated by revenge, Saddam would seek to inflict
the maximum damage on his enemies, whether Iraqi or outsiders.”72
230.  The Assessment of the military options is addressed in Section 6.1.
231.  The statements on Iraq’s WMD capabilities and intentions are addressed in
Section 4.3.
Iraq’s declaration, 7 December 2002
232.  Iraq’s declaration was provided to the Security Council on 7 December 2002.
233.  The Iraqi declaration was detailed and technical, written in a combination of
English, Russian and Arabic, with approximately 7,000 pages dealing with ballistic
missile projects.73 A backlog of semi‑annual declarations of activity, covering the
period 1998‑2002 which Iraq had already provided to UNMOVIC, was not then available
to the UK.
234.  On 8 December, the President of the Security Council issued a statement
recording that:
“After consulting with the members of the Security Council, the Presidency decided
to allow access to the Iraqi declaration to those members with the expertise
to assess the risks of proliferation and other sensitive information to begin its
immediate review.
“This review will be in close co‑ordination and consultation with … UNMOVIC and
the … IAEA, and will assist them in producing a working version of the declaration
as soon as possible.”74
235.  In a statement issued on 8 December, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said
that “Iraq’s timely submission of its declaration, parallel to its continuing co‑operation
with the international weapons inspectors, confirms its commitment to act in compliance
with resolution 1441”.75
The UK’s initial response
236.  Mr Blair expressed scepticism about Iraq’s intentions and reiterated that,
if it did not comply, force would be used.
72  JIC Assessment, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Options’.
73  JIC Assessment, 18 December 2002, ‘An Initial Assessment of Iraq’s WMD Declaration’.
74  UN Press Release, 9 December 2002, Press Statement on Iraq by Security Council President
(SC/7590).
75  Telegram 448 Moscow to FCO London, 9 December 2002, ‘Russia: Local Reaction to Iraqi Declaration’.
43
Previous page | Contents | Next page