3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
“… it
actually then was very helpful for him to do this, because he
focused our
minds,
quite rightly, on the need to get the right resolution in 1441 … He
wanted
to make it
absolutely clear that it wasn’t merely … going down the UN route,
it is
getting the
right resolution that will be important.”200
503.
When Mr
Blair spoke to President Bush on 31 July, the “central issue of
a
casus
belli” and the need for further work on the optimal route to
achieve that,
was
discussed.
504.
Mr Blair
said that he wanted to explore whether the UN was the right
route
to set
an ultimatum or whether it would be an obstacle.
505.
Mr Blair
did not tell President Bush that he had been advised that the
UK
would need
a new UN resolution to provide legal authority for military
action.
506.
Mr Blair spoke
to President Bush on 31 July.201
Mr Rycroft’s
letter recording
the
conversation stated that it had become clear during Sir David
Manning’s visit to
Washington
that the US was not about to take imminent action in Iraq and was
focusing
on the
political context.
507.
In his
conversation with President Bush, Mr Blair had made clear that
there was
“no doubt
that the UK would be with the US on Iraq”. He wanted to explore
whether the
UN route
was the right way of setting an ultimatum or whether it would be an
obstacle
and further
work on whether we should go for a UNSCR to address “how we
could
ensure that
Saddam did not play us around”. There were many parts of Iraq into
which
Saddam
Hussein could not allow the inspectors. It could be possible to
construct a quick
and neat
ultimatum but, “If this route were not to produce the right result,
we should not
go down
it.”
508.
Mr Blair added
that he had an “open mind”:
“If the
ultimatum were too difficult or if it complicated the task, we
should not do it.
But, if we
could, it would be the simplest way of building the coalition and
weakening
the
opposition to military action. Focusing on the end-state of a
democratic Iraq
would give
us the moral high ground.”
509.
Mr Blair had
also discussed the importance of moving forward the
MEPP,
including
to secure the support of Arab leaders, and the possibility of a
visit to the US in
the autumn.
200
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 148.
201
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Phone
Call with President Bush,
31 July’.
87