The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
General David Petraeus,
Commanding General MNF‑I, and
Ambassador Ryan Crocker,
US
Ambassador to Iraq, remained “circumspect” on the timing of
PIC.275
They
considered
that there
remained “significant problems” associated with “unstable politics”
and “JAM
infiltration”
in Basra.
781.
As they
reached the end of their respective tours of duty, both Major
General
Jonathan
Shaw, General Officer Commanding MND(SE) from January to August
2007,
and
Lieutenant General William Rollo, Senior British Military
Representative – Iraq
from July
2007 to March 2008, identified the impact of limited resources on
the UK’s
military
effort and questioned the drive for continued drawdown in Iraq in
order to
prioritise
resources for Helmand. Maj Gen Shaw wrote: “We have been
hamstrung for
resources
throughout the tour, driven by the rising strategic significance of
the Afghan
782.
During a visit
to Iraq in October 2007, ACM Stirrup was briefed by Major
General
Graham
Binns, General Office Commanding MND(SE) from August 2007 to
February
2008, that
the ISF might have only limited ability to cope in the event that
JAM resumed
combat
operations. The JIC and others also identified continued weaknesses
in the
ISF. Their
“ability and willingness to maintain security in the South remains
patchy and
dependent
on MNF training, logistic and specialist air
support”.277
783.
On 27 February
2008, the JIC assessed security prospects in the South at
the
request of
the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ): security in Basra
remained
a concern.
784.
In March 2008,
Prime Minister Maliki instigated the Charge of the Knights
to
tackle militia
groups in Basra. That such an important operation came as a
surprise
was an
indication of the distance between the UK and Iraqi Governments at
this point.
785.
When the
Charge of the Knights began, the UK found itself to be
both
compromised
in the eyes of the Iraqi Government and unable to offer
significant
operational
support, as a result of the tactical decision to negotiate with
JAM1 and the
absence of
situational awareness in Basra after withdrawing from the Basra
Palace site.
786.
On 1 April,
ACM Stirrup briefed the Overseas and Defence Sub-Committee of
the
National
Security, International Relations and Development Committee
(NSID(OD)) that
the UK
military task would be complete by the end of 2008; its timetable
would not be
affected by
the Charge of the Knights.
275
Minute Kyd
to PS/SofS [MOD], 5 July 2007, ‘CDS visit to Iraq 1‑3 Jul
07’.
276
Letter Shaw
to Houghton, 14 August 2007, ‘Post operation report Shawforce
Jan‑Aug 07’.
277
JIC
Assessment, 27 February 2008, ‘Iraq: Security Prospects in the
South’.
108