9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
take
decisive action themselves against militant JAM, IDF teams and
malign Iranian
influence”.
She judged:
“We don’t
have time to change the political soil in Basra or any realistic
prospect of
getting rid
of JAM. Given that, what will success look like? One possible
definition of
our
political end state is a more stable Basra in which parties are
willing to resolve
confrontations
without recourse to serious violence; and in which JAM can be
kept
in line by
other political forces (as happens in Dhi Qar and Muthanna).
Achieving a
political
equilibrium in Basra will be much more difficult than in those two
provinces
because
tribal influences are weaker, the political parties and malign
Iranian
influence
are stronger and there is a large population of poor and
disenfranchised
Marsh
Arabs. But our planned re‑posturing away from the city centre and
the
associated
information operations campaign may provide a more
favourable
environment
in which a political deal could emerge.
“At the
centre of a revamped Better Basra Plan, we therefore need a
political plan for
getting
Basra to PIC and beyond … This will need to be carefully calibrated
with the
Central
Government, whose attention currently is very heavily focused on
Baghdad.
And it is
important to acknowledge that we do not have a sufficiently clear
picture of
Basrawi
politics and their connection to Baghdadi politics to be confident
that any
plan is
credible.”
560.
Dr Marsden set
out an outline of elements that might form part of such a plan
and
sought
approval from the Iraq Senior Officials Group to work up a more
detailed plan.
561.
On 11
February, Lt Gen Lamb reported successful operations by Iraq’s
security
forces.290
He
commented that the ongoing dialogue with those connected with the
Sunni
insurgency
“continues to bear fruit” but his interlocutors were not yet ready
to give full
levels of
trust to the government. The civil bureaucracy remained stretched
and was
“arguably
untenable in its current form”.
562.
On 12
February, Mr Asquith met Mr Tariq Abdullah, Prime
Minister Maliki’s Chief
of Staff,
to talk through the UK’s plans in Basra.291
He
explained that the UK intended to:
“… transfer
sites in the city to the Iraqi authorities. In parallel, we would
be
concentrating
most of our staff in the Air Station to maximise the effect of
civilian and
military
effort designed to create the conditions for PIC.”
563.
Mr Asquith
explained that there would remain a British military presence at
Basra
Palace.
Mr Abdullah gave an assurance that the Prime Minister and his
office were
supportive
of what Mr Asquith had outlined.
290
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 11 February 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (244) 11 Feb
07’.
291
eGram
5872/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 12 February 2007, ‘Iraq: Basra –
Discussion with the Prime
Minister’s
Office’.
105