9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
949.
Lt Gen Lamb’s
position was reported as:
“SBMR‑I …
remains generally supportive of the initiative but flags up several
risks,
which are
recognised in the submission and which we would not
dispute:
•
Possible
Government of Iraq suspicion or outright opposition
•
The risks
of undermining broader engagement through a local approach in
MND
(SE)
•
US
opposition to a suspension of strike operations
“SBMR‑I
also comments that the MNF‑I side in the negotiations is not being
tough
enough with
[JAM1].”
950.
Mr Asquith’s
position was reported to be that:
“… he did
not have a problem with doing a deal with [JAM1], but he too argued
that
the
negotiating position should be much tougher, commenting on policy
as follows:
a. We
should not undertake to suspend strike operations (para 8b)
–
particularly
as [operations by another body] will continue
unaffected.
b. We
should include a cessation of EFP [Explosively Formed
Projectile]
attacks as
the test for [JAM1] to pass (ie not just IDF).
c. We
should not leave ambiguity over strike action against secret cells
or our
expectation
that [JAM1] controls their activity (para 15).
d. It is
unrealistic for the process to be brought to a close
straightforwardly if
the US at
some point demand that we cease contacts with [JAM1].
Having
led him
down the garden path, he will take it out on us when he sees
that
we’ve
deposited him on the compost heap.
e. I don’t
see in the submission description of how we will seek to
set
mainstream
JAM against secret cells (para 11).
f.
Any
‘cease‑fire’ we might offer on our part should not, in my view,
be
province
wide (para 8b) – we should limit it to Basra City.
g. It seems
that two of [JAM1]’s desired six were released before the 48
hour
cease‑fire
– if so this was unwisely generous.
h. [JAM1]’s
been shut up for two years. Why is he now motivated by
fear
of being
supplanted or suspicion of Iranian influence? Are we
being
uncharacteristically
naïve?”
951.
The senior
official added:
“Following
further discussions, HMA [Mr Asquith] raised the
following:
–
The
end state is not clear. Buying repeated cease‑fires of one
month
duration
(until the UK military withdraw from Basra province?) seems a
lot
to give
away for questionable delivery.
179