6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
•
A “running
start”, with extra forces being deployed as the initial attacks
were
under way,
which would have the advantage of surprise and allow for
operations
as early as
October 2002.
•
A
“generated start”, allowing full deployment before the beginning of
operations,
which was
expected to require three months longer.54
113.
Maj Gen Fry
wrote that the “running start” option carried considerably more
risk
and would
be “much more manoeuvrist” than the type of operations which had
been
conducted
in 1991. A number of issues for the UK were identified including:
the role and
timing for
a UK contribution; the need for very early decision making; how to
integrate
into a
complex US plan; levels of risk; UK participation in US exercises;
and the likely
US
expectations that would result from UK involvement in the planning
process.
114.
On
2 July, Mr Watkins wrote to Sir David Manning with the
outcome of the US
visit.55
While a “de
facto invitation to the UK and Australia to participate” was “now
on
the table”,
the extent of the desired UK contribution was
“unclear”.
115.
In July,
the Chiefs of Staff were informed that some stocks were sufficient
to
protect
only a medium scale UK deployment from biological
attack.
116.
A revised
version of the SPG paper ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on Iraq’
was
produced on
11 July for a “Strategic Think Tank” on Iraq the following
week.56
117.
The section on
NBC force protection had been expanded to explain that
the
UK
possessed “sufficient stocks” of Individual Protective Equipment
for a large scale
deployment.
Taking UOR action (“in 3 months or less”) could address “a number
of
shortfalls”
but the “main shortfall” was in protection against a Biological
Warfare (BW)
attack, for
which manufacturing time was needed for additional equipment. There
were
limited
medical countermeasures to respond to a BW attack and the UK had
“adequate
stocks”
only to support medium scale UK deployments.
118.
The
sustainment of operations beyond the level set out in the DPAs had
“not been
factored
into calculations to date”.
119.
The key risks
for UK capabilities included:
•
preparation
times for the desertisation of vehicles;
•
not knowing
whether there was sufficient industrial capacity available to
satisfy
the “likely
UOR/preparation requirements” (and this could not be resolved
until
clearance
had been given to engage industry); and
•
BW medical
countermeasures being restricted to a medium scale force
package.
54
Minute Fry
to MA/DCDS(C), 26 June 2002, ‘Comments on US Planning for Possible
Military Action
Against
Iraq’.
55
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 2 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
56
Paper
[SPG], 11 July 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
19