4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
274.
On 6 February,
Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei met Mr Blair and
Mr Straw.
275.
In the meeting
with Mr Blair, Dr Blix registered a number of questions
about
Secretary
Powell’s briefing to the Security Council the previous
day.111
He also
said that
intelligence
leads had so far produced only one success.
276.
The record of
the meeting stated that Dr Blix:
“… would
seek to resolve three relatively minor points related to process:
U2
overflights,
interviews, and Iraqi domestic legislation. His approach would be
that
the Iraqis
had better come up with co-operation on substance … If Saddam
decided
to be as
helpful on substance as he was on process, fine.”
277.
Mr Blair
doubted that Saddam Hussein would co-operate:
“He would
try some trick to divide the Security Council. Retaining his WMD
was
essential
to his own view of his grip on Iraq.”
278.
Dr Blix
reminded Mr Blair that: “UNSCOM had not reported that the
1999
left‑overs
were present in Iraq, just that they were unaccounted for.” UNMOVIC
was
more
cautious than the UK, but Dr Blix agreed that if Iraq did not have
documents it
should be
more eager to allow interviews to go ahead. There was a stalemate
on the
issue. The
inspectors might have to ask for interviews without minders, but Dr
Blix was
uneasy
about risking people’s lives.
279.
Dr Blix was
reported to have informed Mr Blair that his report to the
Security
Council on
14 February would probably contain a “balance sheet”. His last
assessment
had been
“honest but harsh”; the next might have to say that the inspectors
“had not
found any
WMD”.
280.
In response to
a comment by Mr Blair that containment “was not a long term
policy,
and
sanctions caused misery to the Iraqi people”, Dr Blix “commented
that it would
be
paradoxical to go to war for something that might turn out to be
very little”. Mr Blair
replied
that “if Saddam had no or little WMD he should prove
it”.
281.
Mr Rycroft
reported that Sir David Manning had:
“…
underlined we were confident of our judgements on Iraq’s CBW. If
the inspectors
had
difficulty finding it, this was because Saddam was not
co-operating.”
282.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that Dr Blix felt that Secretary Powell had
done
well but
was avoiding comment.112
Dr Blix was
“pretty cagey” and had “made clear his
job was to
be sceptical”. Dr Blix was talking to Iraq about enhanced
co-operation and
111 Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meetings
with Blix and ElBaradei,
6 February’.
112
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
345