3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
“But there
is no evidence that these contacts led to practical co-operation;
we judge
it unlikely
because of mutual mistrust … There is no evidence UBL’s
organisation
has ever
had a presence in Iraq.”
251.
Since 11
September, Saddam Hussein had “felt under pressure” and
“adopted
a low
profile”:
“The
current US focus on the war against terrorism would make a heavy
response
inevitable
if Iraq mounted or sponsored a terrorist attack on Western or
regional
interests.
Iraq would also pay a wider political price, losing the
international
support it
derives from sanctions-related propaganda. We assess that
Saddam
is likely
to have ruled out any terrorist attacks against the US or its
allies for
the time
being.”
252.
The Assessment
stated:
“Although
the risks to Iraq have increased, we judge the regime is likely
still to see
terrorism
as a tool of policy. Saddam may be currently constrained, but he
hates the
US and UK,
and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for their continued support to the
West.
In the
medium term, therefore, the threat to Western and Gulf interests
remains
credible.
Saddam is an opportunist. We judge he would be willing to use
terrorism
if he
thought he could gain advantage or exact revenge … without
attracting
disproportionate
retaliation. Saddam has miscalculated in the past and he
could
again
misread the response his actions would attract.”
253.
Addressing
what would happen if the US attacked Iraq, the Assessment
stated:
•
Iraq was
“likely to consider terrorism as one of its few realistic options
in
response to
a major US attack”. It saw “no need to raise the stakes” in
response
to limited
coalition action in the NFZs, and the Desert Fox campaign
[in
December
1998] was not “sufficiently damaging to justify the risk. But a
longer
campaign
aimed at regime change could alter Saddam’s
calculations.”
•
Iraq would
claim attacks against US targets were “acts of
self-defence”.
•
It was
“also possible that terrorist groups not previously aligned with
Iraq would
consider
conducting terrorist attacks against the Western ‘aggressors’
…”
•
“Overall …
unless the Iraqi regime’s hold on power was threatened, it would
be
unlikely to
undertake or sponsor such terrorist attacks, for fear of provoking
a
more severe
US response.”
254.
The Assessment
concluded that “Iraqi capability and willingness to
conduct
WMD terrorism” was
“not known with any certainty”. The JIC judged Iraq was
“capable
of
constructing devices to disperse chemical or biological agent, or
radiological material”,
but it had
“no reliable intelligence of any Iraqi intent. Nor did it
have:
“… any
credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD-related technology
and
expertise
to terrorist groups, or of any Iraqi role in the anthrax attacks in
the US.
355