1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
knows to be
credible … ready to strike … if he again poses a threat to
his
neighbours
or develops weapons of mass destruction”;
•
radical
improvement of sanctions-enforcement;
•
“… an
intensive diplomatic process … to forge a new strategy for
stability in
relations
between the international community and Iraq”; and
•
“… ways in
which an effective inspections and monitoring regime … can
be
resumed”.
713.
The UK would
“continue to engage with the Iraqi opposition to help them
develop
their
vision of a better Iraq”.
714.
Mr Blair
stated that nearly 100 sites were attacked, US and UK forces fired
more
than 400
cruise missiles and there were more than 200 aircraft strikes
between 16 and
715.
The sites
which were targeted comprised:
•
30 sites
which the UK government described as being involved in
Iraq’s
weapons of
mass destruction programmes;
•
20 command,
control and communications targets, which Saddam Hussein
used
to control
military and internal security forces;
•
10
Republican Guard targets;
•
27 air
defence targets;
•
six
airfields, including those associated with helicopter forces used
for internal
repression;
and
•
an oil
refinery near Basra associated with sanctions
breaking.281
716.
The
International Institute for Strategic Studies stated that “a
limited number
of
workshops in half a dozen declared missile facilities were bombed
and damaged,
including
the final assembly and production lines of the
al-Samoud”.282
717.
In an
Assessment in May 2001, the JIC recorded that Operation Desert Fox
had
targeted:
“•
WMD related
industrial facilities, including those connected with ballistic
missile
production
and a castor oil plant that could be used to support the
production
of BW;
280
Le Monde
diplomatique,
20 December 1998, Conférence
de presse du premier ministre britannique
Anthony
Blair.
281
Le Monde
diplomatique,
20 December 1998, Conférence
de presse du premier ministre britannique
Anthony
Blair; House of
Commons, Iraq: ‘Desert
Fox’ and Policy Developments,
10 February 1999,
Research
Paper 99/13, page 17; In his speech to the National Press Club on
23 December 1998,
Mr Samuel
(Sandy) Berger, National Security Advisor to the President, stated
that the targets included TV
and radio
transmitters.
282
IISS
Strategic Dossier, 9 September 2002, Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction – A Net Assessment,
page
65.
157