9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
operation
in Iraq with Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker. Although the
general
message
appeared to have been taken on board, the detailed implications
(for example,
that the UK
would have no power to intern) did not seem to have been
appreciated.
615.
NSID(OD) met
on 20 November to take stock of the situation in
Basra.286
Cabinet Office
officials briefed Mr Brown, the Chair, that the main aim of
the meeting
was “to
ensure that the transfer to Iraqi control in Basra, scheduled for
17 December
is not
delayed” and that the meeting would need to assess the security
situation in
Basra and
look at how to sustain the present reduction in violence, including
through
possible
political or economic measures.
616.
At the
meeting, Mr Miliband reported that the security situation was
“encouraging”,
putting the
UK “on track” for the transfer to Iraqi control to take place, on
schedule,
on
17 December.287
Risk came
from the uncertainty over Governor Waili’s position.
Mr Miliband
reported that the inter-departmental work on contacts with local
militias
had been
good, but it would be important in future to ensure that
negotiations with local
militia
leaders did not favour any one person but were inclusive – the UK
should support
the
process, not an individual.
617.
Mr Alexander
reported that Mr Michael Wareing, the International CEO of
KPMG,
had agreed
to help drive forward the work of the Basra Development
Commission
(BDC).
Several of the projects included within the BDC’s 2007 plan had
been
requested by
local militia leaders, which would help “lock them into the
economic and
political
process”.
618.
Mr Browne
observed that, from a force protection perspective, it would
be
important
to keep local militia leaders engaged and bring them into the wider
political
and
economic process as much as possible. Sir John Scarlett agreed that
it would be
important
to find ways of broadening the dialogue to address a wider range of
political
and
economic issues.
619.
Summing up the
meeting, Mr Brown said that:
•
the UK
should “press ahead” for the transfer of security responsibility to
Iraqi
control on
17 December;
•
economic
projects should be agreed through proper discussion with
local
representatives,
rather than favouring any faction or individual, though that
“did
not
preclude using a coincidence of interest to draw local militia
leaders into the
wider
political process”;
•
Mr Alexander
should write with plans for the launch of the BDC; and
•
the UK
should continue to encourage the Iraqi Government to hold
provincial
elections
as soon as possible.
286
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 19 November
2007, ‘NSID(OD) Iraq Meeting –
Steering
Brief: Tuesday 20 November 16:45-17:30’.
287
Minutes, 20
November 2007, NSID(OD) meeting.
297