Executive
Summary
71.
The discussion
in Cabinet was couched in terms of Iraq’s need to comply with
its
obligations,
and future choices by the international community on how to respond
to the
threat
which Iraq represented.
72.
Cabinet
endorsed the conclusion that Iraq’s WMD programmes posed a threat
to
peace, and
endorsed a strategy of engaging closely with the US Government in
order to
shape
policy and its presentation. It did not discuss how that might be
achieved.
73.
Mr Blair
sought and was given information on a range of issues before
his
meeting
with President Bush at Crawford on 5 and 6 April. But no formal and
agreed
analysis of
the issues and options was sought or produced, and there was no
collective
consideration
of such advice.
74.
Mr Straw’s
advice of 25 March proposed that the US and UK should seek
an
ultimatum
to Saddam Hussein to re-admit weapons inspectors.21
That would
provide a
route for
the UK to align itself with the US without adopting the US
objective of regime
change.
This reflected advice that regime change would be
unlawful.
75.
At Crawford,
Mr Blair offered President Bush a partnership in dealing
urgently
with the
threat posed by Saddam Hussein. He proposed that the UK and the US
should
pursue a
strategy based on an ultimatum calling on Iraq to permit the return
of weapons
inspectors
or face the consequences.22
76.
President Bush
agreed to consider the idea but there was no decision
until
September
2002.
77.
In the
subsequent press conference on 6 April, Mr Blair stated that
“doing nothing”
was not an
option: the threat of WMD was real and had to be dealt
with.23
The
lesson
of 11
September was to ensure that “groups” were not allowed to develop a
capability
they might
use.
78.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair characterised the message that he and President Bush
had
delivered
to Saddam Hussein as “change the regime attitude on WMD inspections
or
face the
prospect of changing regime”.24
79.
Documents
written between April and July 2002 reported that, in the
discussion
with President
Bush at Crawford, Mr Blair had set out a number of
considerations
in relation
to the development of policy on Iraq. These were variously
described as:
•
The UN
inspectors needed to be given every chance of success.
•
The US
should take action within a multilateral framework with
international
support,
not unilateral action.
21
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 25 March 2002,
‘Crawford/Iraq’.
22
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 8 April 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to the
United States: 5‑7 April’.
23
The White
House, 6 April 2002, President
Bush, Prime Minister Blair Hold Press Conference.
24
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
13