The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Whitehall
and we needed to ensure that this was recognised.”
Mr Chakrabarti reported
that he had
already spoken to Sir Andrew Turnbull and Mr O’Donnell about
the issue.
1286.
Ministerial
responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction is addressed
in
Section 10.1.
1287.
DFID
produced its first substantive paper on post-conflict
reconstruction
at the end
of March.
1288.
DFID
described the paper to the Cabinet Office as a “work-in-progress”
that
set out
some “preliminary ideas on reconstruction planning”.
1289.
DFID
officials told Ms Short that it would be useful to show No.10
and
the Cabinet
Office that DFID was not only the natural lead on the UK’s
overall
approach to
rebuilding Iraq, but also had the human resources and
experience
to dedicate
to it.
1290.
On 27 March,
Mr Fernie sent a draft paper on reconstruction planning
to
Ms Short.538
She had
seen an earlier draft on 20 March. Officials were:
“… now
thinking how to take this forward as part of a more comprehensive
DFID‑led
process
across Whitehall, looking at the whole range of international
activities
needed to
help Iraq recover from conflict, sanctions and years of
misrule”.
1291.
Mr Fernie
explained that the draft had been revised to take account of
comments
from Ms
Short on:
“… getting
the multilateral system working to support Iraqi institutions,
the
importance
of sustainable debt and reparations strategy, and focusing on using
and
developing
Iraqi talent rather than bringing in too many international
consultants”.
1292.
Comments had
also been received from the FCO, The Treasury and the
Cabinet
Office.
Those centred on:
•
“What we
would do if there were no UNSCR authorising
reconstruction.”
Mr Fernie
advised that, with the Attorney General’s advice now in
writing,
“we should
stick to our position that without an SCR the UK can only
support
humanitarian
relief and basic civil administration reform to ensure
public
security”.
•
“Setting
reconstruction planning within a wider post-conflict context.”
Mr Fernie
advised
that a broader, more strategic paper would be needed.
538
Minute
Fernie to Private Secretary/Secretary of State [DFID], 27 March
2003, ‘Iraq: Iraq Reconstruction
Planning’
attaching Paper DFID, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Reconstruction
Planning: Objectives and
Approach’.
538