The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

368. Sir David wrote that he had “therefore, asked John Scarlett to review all the

intelligence on Saddam’s military capabilities and intentions, including:

• What military equipment do we think Saddam possesses, and in what state

of effectiveness?

• In particular, does he [Saddam] have chemical and biological agents; and if so,

can he weaponise them?

• If he can weaponise them, do we believe he can deliver them by missile or

aircraft?”

369. Sir David pointed out that Iraq had not used chemical or biological agents during

the 1991 Gulf Conflict, but he was unsure whether that was because Iraq did not have

the capability or for other reasons. He was:

“… anyway left very uneasy by Mike Boyce’s suggestion that the Americans

believe that Saddam would only use CBW as a last resort. If this is the American

assessment, it strikes me as alarmingly complacent. Saddam will know that once

the US launches an attack, the game is up. From his point of view, it will be last

resort time from the moment the first Marines hit the beach. And with all the wisdom

of the armchair strategist, it seems to me that the temptation to let fly at the Kuwait

bottleneck, with everything in his armoury, could be very strong indeed.”

370. These questions were addressed in the JIC Assessment of 9 September

(see Section 4.2).

371. Mr Scarlett was also asked to “do more work on regime cohesion” in the light of

what Sir David described as “a risk of American wishful thinking”. Sir David commented:

“Perhaps the Saddam tyranny will collapse like a pack of cards as they hope. But we

should not count on it. We need as much intelligence as we can get on the popular

mood, and the attitude of Saddam’s entourage, before making assumptions that

determine military planning.”

372. Sir David added that he would try to explore the answers to his questions during

his visit to Washington the following week.

373. Sir Christopher Meyer told a US official that, if the US decided to move

against Saddam Hussein, the UK would be “with them”.

374. Sir Christopher also reported his continuing concerns that the UK’s

“conditions” were being discounted and his perception that the US Administration

had concluded that the efforts to get UN inspectors back into Iraq had “run their

course”.

375. In Sir David Manning’s view, President Bush was “impatient to move”.

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