3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
respected.
These views and positions are very important, and we agree with
them.
We hope the
Security Council will give them serious
consideration.”
530.
Mr Zhang
stated that disarmament was “at the core of the Iraqi question”,
but:
“Only when
the … weapons inspectors return to Iraq and conduct effective
inspections
can the
truth ultimately emerge.” He welcomed the agreements reached in
Vienna for
inspections,
adding that China hoped Iraq would “honour its commitments and
translate
them into
actual deeds”, and it believed weapons inspectors should
return:
“… as soon
as possible to conduct independent, fair and professional
inspections
and report
truthfully and in a timely manner to the Council the results of
such
inspections,
so that the Council can draw objective, fair and realistic
conclusions …
“Under such
circumstances, it is not that we cannot consider the adoption by
the
Council of
a new resolution … Such a draft … however, should be practical
and
feasible,
in the interests of an appropriate settlement …”
“The Iraqi
question has reached a critical juncture. The international
community
has high
hopes of the Security Council. It hopes that the Council will be
able to
effectively
undertake its responsibilities to maintain international peace and
security
and take
action to safeguard the purposes and principles of the Charter.
The
Chinese
Government is ready to join other countries in promoting an
appropriate
settlement
of the Iraqi question within the Security Council.”
532.
Ambassador
Negroponte described President Bush’s speech to the
General
Assembly on
12 September as a “declaration of purpose, not a declaration of
war”
which had:
“… put the
United Nations in the spotlight and challenged the
international
community
to restore the Security Council’s relevance on this issue by
confronting
this threat
to international peace and security and 11 years of failure by Iraq
to
accept the
demands made of it after its invasion and destruction of
Kuwait.”
533.
The threat
from Iraq was “serious and unique”, arising directly from Iraq’s
“history
of
aggression and brutality, its defiance of the international
community and its drive
towards an
arsenal of terror and destruction”. It was a regime which
had:
•
“invaded
two of its neighbours and tried to annihilate one of
them”;
•
“used
chemical weapons on its neighbours and on its very own
citizens”;
•
“lied about
its development of weapons of mass destruction”; and
•
“signed the
Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty and then proceeded to
develop
a major
nuclear weapons programme”.
534.
Since 1991,
the Council had “tried in every way to bring Iraq to peaceful
fulfilment
of the …
cease-fire”, but the Iraqi regime had “violated all of its
obligations”.
295