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3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –
the negotiation of resolution 1441
respected. These views and positions are very important, and we agree with them.
We hope the Security Council will give them serious consideration.”
530.  Mr Zhang stated that disarmament was “at the core of the Iraqi question”, but:
“Only when the … weapons inspectors return to Iraq and conduct effective inspections
can the truth ultimately emerge.” He welcomed the agreements reached in Vienna for
inspections, adding that China hoped Iraq would “honour its commitments and translate
them into actual deeds”, and it believed weapons inspectors should return:
“… as soon as possible to conduct independent, fair and professional inspections
and report truthfully and in a timely manner to the Council the results of such
inspections, so that the Council can draw objective, fair and realistic conclusions …
“Under such circumstances, it is not that we cannot consider the adoption by the
Council of a new resolution … Such a draft … however, should be practical and
feasible, in the interests of an appropriate settlement …”
531.  Mr Zhang concluded:
“The Iraqi question has reached a critical juncture. The international community
has high hopes of the Security Council. It hopes that the Council will be able to
effectively undertake its responsibilities to maintain international peace and security
and take action to safeguard the purposes and principles of the Charter. The
Chinese Government is ready to join other countries in promoting an appropriate
settlement of the Iraqi question within the Security Council.”
532.  Ambassador Negroponte described President Bush’s speech to the General
Assembly on 12 September as a “declaration of purpose, not a declaration of war”
which had:
“… put the United Nations in the spotlight and challenged the international
community to restore the Security Council’s relevance on this issue by confronting
this threat to international peace and security and 11 years of failure by Iraq to
accept the demands made of it after its invasion and destruction of Kuwait.”
533.  The threat from Iraq was “serious and unique”, arising directly from Iraq’s “history
of aggression and brutality, its defiance of the international community and its drive
towards an arsenal of terror and destruction”. It was a regime which had:
“invaded two of its neighbours and tried to annihilate one of them”;
“used chemical weapons on its neighbours and on its very own citizens”;
“lied about its development of weapons of mass destruction”; and
“signed the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty and then proceeded to develop
a major nuclear weapons programme”.
534.  Since 1991, the Council had “tried in every way to bring Iraq to peaceful fulfilment
of the … cease-fire”, but the Iraqi regime had “violated all of its obligations”.
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