3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

1008. In their subsequent discussion, President Lagos agreed to consider

Mr Blair’s proposals and to discuss them with President Fox.

1009. Mr Blair spoke to President Lagos on 5 March about rallying international

support and making public opinion understand why he thought Saddam Hussein

was not co‑operating.317

1010. Mr Blair wanted President Lagos’ view on:

“… setting a deadline for full co-operation, and saying that if the Iraqis did not

co‑operate … they would be in breach. In parallel, we would set out our criteria

for co-operation. This would face Saddam with the decision: co-operate, leave the

scene or face the use of force. It would make clear that force was our last resort.”

1011. President Lagos agreed to consider the proposal and Mr Blair’s suggestion

of a meeting in Chile, to discuss it with President Fox and others, and to respond

the following day.

1012. Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair wanted to go to Moscow and the US as well as

Chile: “We are in this and nobody must think we would ever wobble.”318 Mr Campbell’s

view was that the idea of a visit to Chile “was clearly not on as things stood” and Mr Blair

would need a purpose for a meeting with President Bush.

1013. Mr Campbell added that Mr Blair described the purpose of a visit to the US as

“to get them to do the right thing”. Mr Campbell had responded that the US was “already

very clear about their purpose, which was to go for it”. He had also asked Mr Blair “Are

you not sure that your frustration at the way others are dealing with it is just producing a

kind of wanderlust?” Mr Blair had replied that there was no substitute for face-to-face

meetings. Asked if he was sure the issue was really worth “sacrificing everything”,

Mr Blair had replied that it was:

“… always worth doing what you think is the right thing … Iraq is a real problem,

Saddam is a real problem, for us as much as anyone, and it’s been ignored

too long.”

1014. The British Embassy Washington reported overnight on 5/6 March that the

US was now “firmly on track for military action” and would deal firmly with any

efforts in the UN to slow down the timetable.

1015. The only event which might significantly affect their timetable would be

problems for the UK and the US was therefore pulling out all the stops at the UN.

317 Letter Cannon to Owen, 5 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President of Chile,

5 March’.

318 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

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