3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
119.
Secretary
Powell said that:
“… war in
Iraq would define the first term. He poured scorn on the hawks’
beliefs:
that a
quick triumph was inevitable because Iraqis were waiting to be
liberated; and
that
victory in Iraq would help the MEPP and spread democracy in the
region. What
would the
Syrians and Iranians make of the US action – where
next?”
120.
Asked where
Mr Blair stood, Mr Straw replied:
“… if he
had a free choice, the PM wanted to get rid of Saddam. But the more
he
thought
about it the more difficult it looked to the PM. He would stand by
the US but
he was
worried. The UN was the way through. An effort now could be a dry
run for
later if
military action were required. As the PM had said to him, the UN
should be
seen as an
opportunity, not an obstacle.”
121.
The record of
the discussion was to be seen only by Sir David Manning
and
Mr Blair.
122.
In his memoir,
Mr Straw wrote:
“Not for
the first time, and certainly not for the last, Colin opened up to
me about his
intense
frustration with parts of the Administration; in particular Dick
Cheney and
Don
Rumsfeld … I left the Hamptons pleased that Colin and I were in
agreement
and hopeful
that although it was going to take a great effort, we might be able
to get
the Bush
Administration to go to the UN.”39
123.
During
August 2002, Mr Michael Wood, FCO Legal Adviser, continued
to
express
concerns about assumptions that, in the absence of an identified
legal
basis, the
UK would participate if military action was taken by the
US.
124.
Lord
Goldsmith remained concerned to address the issues.
125.
Mr Wood
wrote to Mr Stephen Wright, FCO Deputy Under Secretary
Defence and
Intelligence,
and other senior colleagues on 15 August expressing concern that,
while he
appreciated
that no decision had been taken, “there appears to be an assumption
that if
military
action were taken by the US, we would not only support but
participate”.40
126.
Mr Wood
wrote that while it was “ultimately for the Attorney General to
advise HMG
on matters
of this importance”, he thought it would “be helpful” to colleagues
to briefly
restate the
legal position. He was “not, at present, aware of facts which would
provide a
respectable
legal basis for military action, though further action by the
Security Council
39
Straw
J. Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
40
Minute Wood
to Wright, 15 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Legality of Use of
Force’.
115