4.4 | The
search for WMD
The ISG
believed insurgent groups were “looking to draw on the knowledge
and
experience
of people previously engaged with Iraq’s CW programme”,
although
the scale
of that effort was “unclear”. The use of mustard and sarin
artillery
shells in
two recent improvised explosive devices was “not a reliable
indicator”.
Those using
the weapons were “probably unaware of their nature”. The
rounds
were in “a
very poor condition and almost certainly part of Iraq’s
pre-1991
stockpile”.
•
Two
consistent themes were emerging from the debriefing of
HVDs:
{{“CW was
used in the Iran-Iraq war, but remaining stocks had
been
destroyed
in 1991, without records”; and
{{after
1991 Saddam Hussein was “determined to maintain
scientific
expertise
for post-sanctions reconstruction of WMD programmes”.
•
The US had
stated that the ISG mission would not change after 30 June,
the
end of the
CPA, but Maj Gen Dayton would be replaced by a one-star US
Marine
Corps
officer.
•
The next
report would be the ISG’s last. Mr Duelfer’s aim was to have a
draft
ready by
the end of June, to be worked on during July and released in
August.
It was
likely to focus on:
{{“Iraqi
contravention of sanctions in the procurement of goods that could
be
used to
support WMD programmes”;
{{diversion of
OFF funds; and
{{a
broader picture of the regime’s “strategic intent” towards
WMD.
785.
In his note to
No.10 officials on 23 May, Mr Blair wrote in relation to
the ISG that it:
“… seems to
be doing nothing. Surely it is absurd that they will say nothing is
found,
though
there was strategic intent; when, in reality, they have been unable
to look.
They need
to leave actual WMD an open issue. Also can I have an assessment
of
the
conventional stockpiles in Iraq at the end of the
war.”437
786.
In response to
the update from Mr Dowse, Mr Blair
commented:
“… the ISG
should not just conclude that there was strategic intent but no
WMD
were found,
when it is clear that they have been unable to look. They need to
leave
WMD as an
open issue.”438
787.
No.10 asked
the “JIC/MOD” for advice on how to get the result Mr Blair
wanted.
788.
In his
discussion with President Bush on 26 May (see
Section 9.2), Mr Blair stated
that the
ISG should not be forgotten and that proper reporting on what it
was up to
437
Note Blair
to Powell, 23 May 2004, ‘Iraq Note’.
438
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 24 May 2004, ‘Iraq’.
439
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 26 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s VTC with
Bush, 26 May’.
577