The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
288.
Although Prime
Minister Maliki was increasingly keen to accelerate the transfer
of
responsibility
for security to Iraqi control, the JIC judged that the ISF would be
likely to
need MNF
support for some time:
“Without it
they will be unable to cope in Baghdad and the Sunni heartlands,
risking
worsening
violence and further weakening of government
authority.”
289.
On 16
November, Major General Simon Mayall, Deputy Commanding
General
MNC‑I, sent
an update to Lt Gen Houghton.162
Maj Gen
Mayall described a “Transition
Bridging
Strategy” that was gaining momentum with senior US
commanders.
The
strategy was based on an assumption that “the Security Line of
Operation is
indispensable
to mission success, but it cannot, and never was intended to
deliver
the
Endstate on its own”. The strategy entailed increasing the size of
training teams
embedded
with the Iraq Army prior to handing over an area to Iraqi control.
Maj Gen
Mayall
assessed:
“… what
this model offers us, and the GoI, is the opportunity to transition
with the
Iraqis, and
thereby set much better conditions, in due course, to transition to
the
Iraqis.
This concept and model, however, is critically depending upon
substantial
support
from the other Lines of Operation.”
290.
At the meeting
of DOP(I) on 16 November Mr Sawers, following his recent
visit
to Iraq,
expressed serious concern at the rise of Shia militias but added
that the biggest
security
concern was still the Sunni insurgency and fear of elements of the
former
regime.163
He reported
that Prime Minister Maliki was frustrated that he was not
in
control of
the security apparatus.
291.
In discussion,
it was suggested that Prime Minister Maliki was constrained by
his
agreement
with Muqtada al‑Sadr and that it was important to recognise that
any Iraqi
leader
would need to reach such political accommodations in order to
function.
292.
The meeting
was told that the text of the international compact had been
agreed
but there
had been little substantive progress and that Mr Blair
considered that
developments
in Iraq, the US and the UK were reaching a critical stage. He
wanted
a
“comprehensive co‑ordinated forward plan for the coming weeks”
covering political,
economic,
governance and security strands. Mrs Beckett said that departments
would
“work
quickly” to produce this.
293.
Mr Browne
reported that planning was taking place in the US to speed up
the
transition
process and that this was consistent with the UK’s Medium Term
Plan. He still
expected
that it would be possible to achieve PIC in Maysan by the end of
2006 and in
Basra in
spring 2007.
162
Minute
Mayall to CJO, 16 November 2006, ‘MNC‑I Update – 16 Nov
06’.
163
Minutes, 16
November 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
56