10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
838.
By 6 November,
the PMO consisted of a Director, Rear Admiral (retired)
David
Nash, two
US Government employees and 13 contractors. Of the 100 US
Government
employees
that Adm Nash requested, only eight arrived by January
2004.
839.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald visited Iraq from 7 to 9 November.473
He reported to
Mr Blair
on his
return, describing two major problems in the political
arena:
•
the failure
of the Governing Council to “get a grip” and “develop a
political
profile”;
and
•
continued
CPA civilian weaknesses; strategic communications in
particular
remained a
serious problem.
840.
Sir Nigel also
advised that he had “put down some markers” with
Ambassador
Bremer on
the pace of privatisation, which Ambassador Bremer had
accepted.
841.
Sir Nigel
separately reported that Ambassador Bremer had told him that he
did
not envisage
any “major” privatisations under the CPA.474
842.
A DFID team
visited Iraq at the end of October to draw up plans for
short-term
support for
public administration and the Governing Council.475
843.
On 15
November, the Governing Council unveiled a timetable for the
transfer of
power to a
transitional administration by 30 June 2004, at which point the CPA
would be
dissolved
(see Section 9.2).476
844.
The decision
to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi government earlier than had
been
expected
had significant implications for the reconstruction effort. The UK
identified the
importance
of reconstruction and in particular job creation programmes, in
supporting
reconciliation
and the political transition process.
845.
Hard
Lessons described the
effect of the new timetable on the CPA’s
reconstruction
effort:
“Reconstruction
plans that had just been devised on a two-year timetable now
had
to shift,
and the rush began to prepare Iraq’s Government to stand on its own
in
473
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 10 November 2003, ‘Visit to
Iraq’.
474
Minute
Cannon to Owen, 12 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Economic Issues: Sir Nigel
Sheinwald’s Visit
to Baghdad’.
475
Letter
Malik to Rycroft, 20 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Public
Administration’.
476
Minute
Figgures to CDS, 16 November 2003, ‘SBMR(IRAQ) Report 047 of 16
November 2003’.
477
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office,
2009.
145