The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
861.
The Red Team
concluded that:
“•
Iraqis look
forward to improved circumstances post-conflict and
their
expectations
that they will be engaged by the Coalition in achieving this
need
to be
accommodated.
•
The way the
military campaign is run, and the early stages of
post-war
operations,
will determine the degree of support the Coalition receives from
the
Iraqi
people; if it is not well handled, we risk compromising overall
success.”
862.
There is no
indication of any response to either of the Red Team’s
pre-conflict
reports,
including the warning of the terrorist threat from Al Qaida against
civilians and
Coalition
Forces in Iraq.
863.
In early
March, Lt Gen Reith discussed the expansion of the UK
combat
role with
US commanders. He continued to advise the Chiefs of Staff to
extend
the UK
AO.
864.
Lt Gen Reith
visited the Middle East from 5 to 7 March, where he
discussed
optimising
the use of 1 (UK) Div combat power “in some detail” with General
John
Abizaid,
Gen Franks’ Deputy Commander (Forward), and then with Lt Gen
McKiernan.360
The record
of the visit stated that Lt Gen Reith “offered” two options for UK
forces to
play a role
in later operations: providing additional combat power to the US
advance
on Baghdad,
or deploying forward by air to the Baghdad area to “assist in
developing
stability
in case of sudden regime collapse”.
865.
A manuscript
note on Maj Gen Fry’s copy of the record stated:
“CDS was
most unhappy … COS [Chiefs of Staff] & SofS [Secretary of
State]
riding
instructions were to not offer anything outside the UK AO but be
receptive
to requests
(‘request mode rather than push mode’). CDS wanted to talk to
CJO
[Lt Gen
Reith] immediately – but will close the loop on Saturday [8 March].
In the
meantime
this note is being kept away from Ministers’
offices.”361
866.
Gen Jackson
visited UK forces in Kuwait between 6 and 8 March and was
involved
in Lt Gen
Reith’s discussion with Lt Gen McKiernan (see Section
6.2).362
He reported
to
Adm Boyce
that:
“Hampered
by lack of domestic and international consensus on Phase III,
planning
for Phase
IV remains the most immature aspect of the operation. The key to
success
in Phase IV
will be legitimisation through multi-nationality, if possible
underpinned by
a further
UNSCR … Early multi-nationalisation of the occupying force should
provide
360
Minute
Dutton to PSO/CDS, 7 March 2003, ‘CJO visit to Middle East 5-7 Mar
03’.
361
Minute
MA/CJO to PSO/CDS, 7 March 2003, ‘CJO visit to Middle East 5-7 Mar
03’.
362
Minute CGS
to CDS, 10 March 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op TELIC’.
468