1.2 | Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September 2001

51. The JIC stated that “Arab rapprochement with Iraq” was “being driven by trade

and political factors over which the UK has little or no control”. The implication of that

rapprochement was that there was less pressure on Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

52. Mr Blair told officials that his preference was to link a shift on sanctions with

the return of inspectors to Iraq, and asked Mr Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary,

for his advice on the approach to adopt with the US.

53. On 24 November, Mr Sawers wrote to Mr Blair advising:

“We face problems ahead on Iraq. Among the Arabs, only Kuwait sees Saddam as a

real threat. Support for economic sanctions is weakening: many Arab countries see

it as ‘punishment’ and think ten years is enough. And Arab perceptions of US and

British support for Israel in the Palestinian crisis is accelerating the breakdown of the

sanctions regime. We have been looking at the policy options, but there are no easy

alternatives.”36

54. Mr Sawers listed examples of “sanctions fatigue” and stated:

“Whether it is Bush or Gore, the incoming US Administration will look again at Iraq

policy. Their first instinct will be to toughen, not weaken, the US approach and seek

Saddam’s ouster. But short of invading Iraq, that is unlikely … The US may also

choose to view Iraq in the wider proliferation context, thus linking it with Iran, rather

than as sui generis.”

55. Mr Sawers identified the issues the UK should consider:

“i. What is our view on continuing economic sanctions?

ii. Should a shift on sanctions be linked with a return of the inspectors? …

But if UNMOVIC ever gets into Iraq, we will be back to the confrontations

we faced with UNSCOM, and Saddam’s finger will remain on the trigger.

iii. Should we continue with the No-Fly Zones? … There is a tricky balance

here.

iv. What posture should we adopt on these issues with the incoming

American Administration? … I am inclined to raise these as questions,

and include other alternatives such as stepping up our efforts to overthrow

Saddam. We should go with ideas and concerns, not with a settled,

revised policy. That way we can take the Americans through the pros and

cons of all the options.”

56. Mr Sawers continued:

“My own view is that we ought to use the arrival of a new Administration to put Iraq

policy on a more sustainable footing. We do not want Saddam to develop WMD or

36 Minute Sawers to Prime Minister, 24 November 2000, ‘Iraq’.

201